August 31, 2026
On August 24, Ukraine celebrated the 35th anniversary of its independence.
The leaders of the Coalition of the Willing convened in Kyiv and via video conference to commemorate the occasion. In a co-chair’s statement, they noted that they were united in their continued support of Ukraine’s fight to defend its sovereignty, freedom, and territorial integrity.[i]
Marking the occasion, the European Commission also issued a statement of solidarity with Ukraine, which rightly underlined the bravery, resistance, and resilience of the Ukrainian people in the face of Russia’s war of aggression. It said that Ukraine belongs in the European family and the European Union and reaffirmed the unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[ii]
In his Ukraine National Day press statement, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said, “The United States is committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty and continues to work to support a negotiated settlement to the Russia-Ukraine war that establishes a lasting and durable peace.”
Despite earlier reports about a first visit to Kyiv, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were not present for Ukraine’s National Day. More importantly, the phrase “territorial integrity” did not appear in Rubio’s statement.[iii]
Only the former US special envoy for Ukraine, retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg, stated on a Ukrainian YouTube channel that Washington would not recognize the occupied Ukrainian territories as Russian, adding that Ukraine would reclaim them.[iv]
The lack of reference to Ukraine’s territorial integrity demonstrates, once again, Washington’s admission that when the war ends, Ukraine will lose some territory.
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, the EU has provided Ukraine and its people financial and military assistance amounting to €220.2 billion. On Ukraine’s Independence Day, the EU approved €6.1 billion in support for air and missile defense systems, missiles, ammunition, and radar systems. Moreover, the EU has adopted 21 packages of anti-Russia sanctions. Thus, if not NATO, the Coalition of the Willing is effectively at an undeclared war with Russia. Moreover, hybrid threats are now becoming a source of concern among NATO countries.
Despite their emphasis on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, European leaders also know that, when the war ends, Ukraine will lose territory. Perhaps their continuing reaffirmation of support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity reflects some regret that, had they engaged Russia earlier, Ukraine’s history could have been written differently. Understandably, Kyiv will not formally agree to any loss of territory. This is why an end to the war would only be a “no war, no peace” situation.
Unfortunately, however, even such a solution remains out of reach for now. On the contrary, there are signals of escalation.
Prime Minister Andy Burnham, stepping onto the international stage during his first foreign trip to Kyiv for Ukraine’s National Day, sharply criticized Russia and announced the delivery of technical blueprints which will allow Ukraine to assemble long-range missiles—drawing a swift response from Moscow. Only two days prior, President Macron announced that France would deliver new interceptor missiles to Kyiv following a major Russian attack on a shopping center in central Ukraine. Interestingly, however, France is now pushing to ensure more EU-backed funding supports European—and potentially French—defense production, according to Euronews.[v]
In recent months, while Russia continued attacking Kyiv with missiles, Ukraine’s air strikes reached deeper into Russia, targeting its military and energy infrastructure, creating supply problems at gas stations despite Russia being an oil-rich country.
On the one hand, with the war now in its fifth year, President Putin is under growing pressure to end it in a way acceptable to the Russian people. On the other hand, Russians’ frustration with European support for Ukraine and the EU’s anti-Russia sanctions encourage him to continue the war. Thus, the question is whether he will prioritize peace talks or dramatically intensify missile attacks before opening the door to a de facto peace. At present, the latter appears more likely, given the manpower problems of a new major land offensive.
In Ukraine, despite strong European support, President Zelensky also faces growing dissatisfaction with the war and domestic political problems. His options, however, are far more limited than President Putin’s.
CIA Director Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow has led to some speculation. It may be that worries about a major escalation in the war prompted his visit.
Today marks the 1649th day of the war in Ukraine, with no end in sight. This war is not just a European problem; it is a security challenge for the world. And there are other challenges. In a must-read Chatham House article, Dr. Patrick Schröder says climate change is now Europe’s biggest systemic security risk and calls for a broad European security-based approach to climate change.[vi] And Nepali Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal has rightly called on the world to embark on a “global effort” to tackle climate change.
Will anyone heed their message? No.
[i] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/co-chairs-statement-of-the-coalition-of-the-willing-24-august-2026
[ii] https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/eu-reaffirms-solidarity-ukraine-35th-anniversary-regained-independence-2026-08-24_en
[iii] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/08/ukraine-national-day-2/
[iv] https://unn.ua/en/news/the-us-will-not-recognize-the-occupied-ukrainian-territories-as-russian-kellogg
[v] https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/25/exclusive-france-wants-to-limit-ukraines-non-european-procurement-with-eu-money
[vi] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/08/wildfires-and-extreme-heat-show-climate-change-now-europes-biggest-security-threat
Diplomatic Opinion - Ali Tuygan 
Ratcliffe’s visit is not so much a harbinger of an impending NATO-Russia war as it is an attempt to prevent such a war from breaking out as a result of miscalculations. The states could not get results through their diplomatic channels, They will not leave the conversation. people who talk alone change. The heads of intelligence are replacing the foreign ministers. The Kremlin stated that there was no direct meeting with President Putin. However, Kremlin also specifically noted that Putin was immediately informed about the contacts. Therefore, the CIA director did not need to be in the same room for his message to reach the Russian leader.
One of the main topics of the visit was to warn Russia against carrying out any direct or indirect operations against NATO countries. NATO also announced that it did not see an imminent threat of conventional attacks. The threat here is not that Russian tanks will cross the Polish border tomorrow morning. The real risk lies in the gray area between war and peace. Cyber attacks, sabotage, targeting of critical infrastructure, airspace violations and operations conducted through proxy elements that are difficult to officially connect to the Russian state make it unclear at what point NATO should respond.
Moscow’s aim may be less to engage in all-out war with NATO and more to test the alliance’s political resilience. For example, a limited sabotage in the Baltic region or a veiled attack on critical infrastructure could test whether Washington can really defend Europe. However, an operation planned as a “limited test” could escalate into direct conflict due to the other party’s different interpretation. Great wars do not always begin with one side’s plan to conquer the world. Sometimes one side thinks the other will not respond, and if the other side doesn’t respond either, they believe it will lose all its deterrent effect. Then everyone finds themselves caught up in a war they never actually wanted.
Ratcliffe’s task may be to explain this line to the Russians as clearly as possible. Washington may have told the Russian security bureau directly which actions would be considered an attack on NATO, how it would face such a situation, and how much information it had about Russian preparations. Statements made in public opinion may be left vague due to propaganda, domestic politics, and diplomatic courtesy. During the closed-door meeting between the two intelligence chiefs, it was stated,”If you do this, you will get this in return.” The possibility of misunderstanding might be reduced as much as possible.
The interesting part is that such a sensitive visit was not conducted in complete secrecy. The American c-17 plane believed to be carrying Ratcliffe was seen on flight tracking systems, the diplomatic convoy in Moscow was displayed, and the visit was reflected in the press within a few hours. A meeting that truly required complete secrecy could have been held in a third country, on a lower-profile aircraft, or through existing diplomatic channels. At that time, the content of the contact was kept secret, while its existence was kept visible. While Washington is sending a special message to the Russians, we can say that it is also sending a message to its allies in Europe that “I can meet directly with Moscow and I draw the red line”.
Describing Trump’s visit as “semi-routine” and then immediately saying “something may come out of it” is also a classic political insurance method. The CIA director’s visit to Moscow while the war was ongoing is by no means routine. However, if the White House presents the visit as a major peace initiative and fails to achieve results, it will pay a political price. By calling it a “semi- routine contact” the possibility of failure is minimized; by saying “something may come out” the ownership of the success possibility is claimed in advance. The fact that American representatives held new talks in both Ukraine and Russia after Ratcliffe’s visit does not mean that a peace agreement is ready..Washington is currently assessing the minimum requirements of both sides. To put it another way, first the CIA checked the temperature of the room; now they are checking whether the diplomats can enter.
It would also not be correct to jump to the conclusion here that “Ukraine lost the war and the US is negotiating surrender terms.” Ukraine’s military problems and Europe’s difficulty in carrying on the war on the same scale without American support are accelerating Washington’s search for negotiations. However for the US, sitting down at the table is not the same as admitting defeat. Whether military pressure could produce a better agreement is being considered alongside whether the same pressure could lead to a NATO-Russia war. Ratcliffe’s visit shows that Washington now views war management and negotiation preparation as two parts of the same process.
One should not interpret all of this as meaning a major reconciliation is beginning between the US and Russia. Intelligence diplomacy can only function when the parties fear the consequences of misunderstanding each other, not when they trust each other. Ratcliffe’s meeting with naryshkin shows not that relations are improving, but that the crisis has become too dangerous to be managed by ordinary diplomatic methods.
From Turkey’s perspective, opening a direct Washington-Moscow channel does not eliminate Ankara’s role, but it does change it. The CIA and SVR can discuss nuclear risk, NATO’s red lines, and the strategic balance between major powers. Turkey the safety of commercial vessels in the Black Sea grain deal, the protection of the harbor, can work on prisoner exchange and applicable technical regulations. One determines at what point the war will escalate into a major power conflict, while the other strives to reduce the daily cost of the current war.There was a previous example of this. in 2022, Naryshkin met with then CIA director William Burns in Ankara, and the Americans told Russia about the consequences of using nuclear weapons . Turkey did not resolve the Ukraine war during that meeting. It provided an acceptable basis for the two nuclear powers to communicate securely. Today, the most tangible area of Ankara is once again the Black Sea region. They are one of the few actors who can negotiate with both Russia and Ukraine regarding safe grain transit, commercial navigation, and port security. If a direct great power bargain begins between Washington and Moscow, Turkey could be left out of the final political agreement. Ankara’s indispensability will not stem from its ability to determine the grand strategy, but from its capacity to establish technical mechanisms capable of operating in the Black Sea.
When William Burns went to Moscow in 2021, he warned Russia against invading Ukraine, but he could not prevent the war. Ratcliffe went with a different question in 2026. The question is no longer whether the war will start, but whether the war that has already begun will escalate into direct conflict between NATO and Russia. In conclusion, Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow was not a peace negotiation. It did not resolve any fundamental disagreements and did not produce a ready-made formula to end the Ukraine war. Besides, the task of intelligence diplomacy is not to resolve disputes.Perhaps the task of intelligence diplomacy is to prevent these disagreements from escalating into war as a result of miscalculation.
Kind Regards