August 24, 2026
On August 15, 2026, Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova was asked about plans by the US and Türkiye to supply arms to Kyiv.
Referring to a “quite a considerable arsenal”, she said, “… these are countries which have been aspiring to play a special role in settling the Ukraine crisis and which have been saying that finding a political and diplomatic solution was their priority…” She also said that such a supply of arms would deal a severe blow to Russia’s bilateral relations with Washington and Ankara, adding that Moscow has asked both capitals for information on the matter.[i]
So far, neither capital has given a public response.
It seems that the US wishes to buy back some weaponry from the Turkish inventory and have it sent to Ukraine.
At a CNN town hall in May 2023, Trump had said: “They’re dying, Russians and Ukrainians. I want them to stop dying. And I’ll have that done — I’ll have that done in 24 hours.” He kept repeating the claim on the campaign trail and continued mentioning a slightly moderated version in the early months of his second term. His attitude toward the war in Ukraine is different than that of European leaders and, in view of close relations between Moscow and Beijing, has a “pivot-to-Asia” dimension.
Türkiye’s story is more complicated.
On November 16, 2015, Presidents Putin and Erdogan met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Turkey. A week later, on November 24, 2015, a stunning development changed the picture. Türkiye, at opposite ends with Russia in Syria, shot down a Russian Su-24 military plane for having violated Turkish airspace for 17 seconds.
Had Turkish-Russian relations been characterized by antagonism, unresolved disputes, and tension, the path to the incident could have been explained more easily. But the two countries were enjoying a stable, friendly, and mutually rewarding relationship for decades. Russia met more than 50% of Turkey’s natural gas needs. Every year more than 4 million Russians came to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast for summer holidays. Turkish companies had undertaken contracts worth billions of dollars in Russia, providing jobs for thousands of Turks. Bilateral trade volume was over 30 billion dollars. Russia was going to build Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. Presidents Putin and Erdogan had given the impression of maintaining a close personal relationship.
In the wake of the incident, President Putin directed harsh accusations against the Turkish government for having links to the Islamic State. He imposed a series of punishing economic sanctions against Ankara. In response, Turkey’s leadership said that more than enough warnings had been issued for airspace violations. It rejected IS-related accusations as slander.
The downing of the Russian Su-24 made Turkey remember NATO. However, members of the alliance understandably preferred to avoid a confrontation with Russia over an incident that had occurred without their having an opportunity to say a word.
Six months later, Ankara’s bravado gave way to reality. On June 27, 2016, the Kremlin announced that President Putin had received a letter from President Erdogan stating that Russia is Turkey’s friend and strategic partner and that the Turkish authorities do not want to ruin relations between the two countries. “We never had the desire or deliberate intention of shooting down the Russian Federation’s plane,” President Erdogan said.[ii]
Thus, the two Presidents met in Moscow on August 9, 2016. An effort to restore the relationship was launched. However, misfortunes were not over. On 19 December 2016, Andrei Karlov, the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, was assassinated by an off-duty Turkish police officer with dubious links at an art exhibition in Ankara.
In 2017, Turkey signed the S-400s deal with Russia, its first major weapons purchase from Moscow. Turkey’s NATO allies were critical of the deal, but Ankara said this was its sovereign decision. As allied criticism became more vocal, it simply said this was a “done deal”. With the deal, Moscow both drove a wedge between Turkey and the US and received 2.5 billion dollars from Ankara.
On October 14, 2020, during an interview, Foreign Minister Lavrov was asked how Türkiye could regularly be called a “strategic ally” despite confrontations in Syria and Libya. He responded by saying that Turkey has never qualified as Russia’s strategic ally. “It is a partner, a very close partner. In many sectors, this partnership is of a strategic nature,” he added.
On October 16, 2020, Türkiye “reportedly” tested its S-400 air defense system. The US State Department said the missile launch was “incompatible with Türkiye’s responsibilities as a NATO ally and strategic partner” of the US. On the same day, Ukraine’s President Zelensky visited Turkey. At a joint press conference, President Erdogan reiterated that Turkey has not recognized Crimea’s unlawful annexation, nor will it. “We, together with Ukrainian authorities, will maintain our support for our Crimean Tatar brothers and sisters, who are a crucial element of the historical and humanitarian ties between Türkiye and Ukraine,” he added.
In brief, the Turkish Government was trying to perform a difficult balancing act between Moscow and Washington. However, Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400s remains a problem, an obstacle to its purchase of F-35s.
On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine,
Türkiye hosted high-level talks between Russia and Ukraine in March and April 2020, under what was called the “Istanbul Process”. The process failed to bring an end to the war.
Yet, on July 22, in Istanbul, Russian and Ukrainian delegations signed individual agreements with Türkiye and the UN to unblock Ukraine’s Black Sea grain exports after a Russian blockade raised fears of a global food crisis. The signatories were Turkish President Erdogan and Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.
In brief, despite its strong disapproval of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ankara never missed an opportunity to underline its desire for peace and its readiness to help achieve that.
In the past, Ankara and Moscow were certainly not on the same page on every issue, but they had a meaningful dialogue. At present, phone calls and visits between Presidents Putin and Erdoğan have become rare. In brief, the relationship between Ankara and Moscow does not appear to be what it was in earlier years.
Cooperation with Washington in supplying arms to Ukraine will be a mistake for our foreign and security policy. Türkiye and Russia are neighbors across the Black Sea. They have a multitude of common interests. For years, when their interests diverged, they successfully managed them. Ankara needs to look at its foreign and security interests with a long-term view. Leaders, governments, and policies change, but memories of wars last. Russia and the Ottoman Empire fought twelve major wars between 1568 and 1918. This is why it took Türkiye and Russia decades and decades to build a better relationship.
European countries, despite their continuing military support to Ukraine, also want to see a quick end to the war. In the not-too-distant future, they would try to resume dialogue with Russia. Interestingly, Germany is behind Ukraine, but unsurprisingly, upon Germany’s request, two Ukrainian suspects have been arrested in Croatia for the Nord Stream gas pipeline explosions in 2022.
As I concluded in a recent post: “Unfortunately, all that can be achieved in the foreseeable future, both in Iran and Ukraine, is a ‘no war, no peace’ situation. Some call them ‘forever wars.’ The question is, were they inevitable?”
Diplomatic Opinion - Ali Tuygan 