August 8, 2026

The victors of the First World War were determined to partition the Ottoman Empire and confine it to central Anatolia. On August 10, 1920, the “Sultan” signed the Treaty of Sèvres, the death sentence of the “Sick Man of Europe.”

When he landed in the Black Sea city of Samsun on May 19, 1919, to launch Türkiye’s War of Independence, Atatürk committed to fighting not only external powers but also internal adversaries who opposed change. Nonetheless, against a multitude of incredible difficulties, the commander who had led Turkish troops to victory in Gallipoli also led the War of Independence to a successful conclusion. With the Treaty of Lausanne signed on July 24, 1923, the Treaty of Sèvres was thrown into the dustbin of history. On October 29, 1923, the Turkish Republic was declared.

Then came Atatürk’s reforms in governance, education, and the economy that moved Türkiye forward and inspired many countries that were to become independent in the years that followed. Turkish women got the right to vote and to be elected in 1934, well before many European countries.

Türkiye remained neutral during the Second World War. Following the war, however, it quickly moved to identify itself even more closely with the West, explicitly adopting Western models. Turkish troops fighting alongside Western allies paved the way for NATO membership in 1952. Türkiye came to be viewed by the West as its eastern bulwark of containment, preventing the Soviet Union’s expansion toward the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. This linkage with and self-identification with the West caused the Turks to be denounced by non-Western, non-aligned countries at the 1955 Bandung conference and to be attacked as blasphemous by Islamic extremists.[i]

Nonetheless, in 1969, Türkiye became a founding member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), formerly named the “Organization of the Islamic Conference.”

Between 1992 and 1994, as Türkiye’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and during later years at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I attended many OIC meetings. I remember vividly that whenever we asked for even the most modest support on issues important to Türkiye, we faced opposition. And among those first raising their hands to express objections were the Palestinians. The OIC still exists, but with the unbridgeable divisions and conflicting interests among its members, today it is a non-entity.

With the 1950 general election, Türkiye embraced a multi-party political system. Unfortunately, since then, our democratic journey has not been smooth sailing. We had parties that sought absolute power—as at present—military interventions, coalition governments, and a resurgence of Islam that started changing the nature of our politics. These negatively impacted our relations with the West.

Türkiye applied for full EU membership on April 14, 1987. At the December 2004 Brussels Summit, the EU declared that Türkiye, under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, had sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria and accession negotiations would start on October 3, 2005. Indeed, they did start. However, with our democratic decline, particularly our so-called “presidential system” adopted through the referendum of April 16, 2017, the obituary for our accession process was written.

Why did the EU decide to launch an accession process with Ankara to start with? After all, Germany was reunified on October 3, 1990, and the Soviet Union dissolved on December 26, 1991. However, uncertainties about Russia’s evolution remained; the US invasion of Iraq created additional Middle East challenges; and membership talks with Ankara were seen as an inconsequential process. Otherwise, the collapse of the Soviet Union, at least for European countries, could have marked the expiry date of Türkiye’s NATO membership.

Since then, some in the West have stressed the importance of having Türkiye “anchored” in Europe and moving past the hypocrisy of pretending that the accession process might move forward. Others have emphasized the need to concentrate on what is doable, perhaps a new partnership. Yet, the two sides have not even been able to update the Customs Union. All that Europe expects from Ankara is to stop migration from the East. The rest is of no interest.

Could Türkiye have joined the EU had it stayed on the democratic path? No, fundamentally because Türkiye is a majority-Muslim country.

Under authoritarian Islamist rule, Türkiye is now increasingly absorbed into the Middle East. Ever since coming to power, the AKP has lauded the country’s Ottoman past while remaining noticeably quiet about its Republican achievements. While AKP leaders visit the Atatürk Mausoleum annually to pay respects on the anniversary of his passing, they rarely emphasize his foundational legacy. Their underlying aim remains a break with the country’s Kemalist foundation.

Had Ankara remained on a democratic trajectory, it could have become the guiding star of the Middle East, the envy of its peoples, if not its autocratic rulers. The citizens of Türkiye, regardless of ethnicity, would have enjoyed peace and prosperity. Ankara would have been more than a desirable partner not just for the West, but for nations across the globe. Unfortunately, the AKP squandered that historic opportunity.

As the Iran war became a challenge for regional security, some started looking for regional arrangements. Thus, a group of four countries called “R4” (Regional4), namely Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and Türkiye, started to emerge as an informal “consultative framework”.

Yesterday, however, Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, President Erdoğan, and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the “Makkah Joint Defense Agreement.” Their joint statement says:

“The Agreement is intended to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression, and stipulates that any armed attack against any one of the three States shall be regarded as an attack against them all. It further provides for the enhancement of all aspects of defense cooperation among the three States.”[ii]

Some in Türkiye have said that the agreement marks the emergence of a “new axis of power” and underlined its “benefits” for national and regional interests. I disagree with their optimism because the agreement raises many questions with no easy answers.

First, the agreement aligns closely with US and Israeli strategic interests in the region. Second, a brief four-paragraph text does not constitute a defense treaty in the conventional sense; it is primarily a statement of intent, open to evolution and to additional signatories. Yesterday, however, Egypt, which participated in earlier quadrilateral talks, was absent in Makkah.

Against whom is this agreement? Iran? Today, Saudi Arabia and Iran are at war. Are we going to be at war with Tehran the next time they fire a missile toward Saudi Arabia? Aren’t Israel and Saudi Arabia informal allies in the war against Iran? Are we integrating ourselves into their de facto alliance, one that the US administration seeks to formalize by drawing Riyadh into the Abraham Accords? Are we going to end our already toned-down anti-Israel rhetoric? What about the possibility of an India-Pakistan conflict? How does this agreement harmonize with our NATO commitments? What obliged Ankara to sign this agreement? What are we getting from this “deal”? If the defense/military dimension of the agreement is nothing but words, what about the political commitments? Doesn’t Türkiye need to follow an independent foreign policy in today’s turbulent world, particularly in the Middle East?

Our Syria policy, our shooting down of a Russian military aircraft for violating our airspace for 17 seconds, our purchase of Russian S-400s, our becoming the number one global rhetorical adversary of Israel, and our support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas were a chain of foreign and security policy mistakes. The signing of the “Makkah Joint Defense Agreement” could be yet another one.

Following the Turkish War of Independence, Western leaders praised Atatürk’s military genius and his reforms, yet deep inside they were fundamentally unhappy with his achievements. Their original vision at the end of the First World War was to restrict Türkiye to a modest territory in central Anatolia—a weak state anchored to decaying Ottoman traditions and tied to the Middle East. Atatürk upended that strategic calculus. However, major powers operate on long horizons, much like the course plans of large ocean-going vessels. Such ships do not maneuver erratically; they stay on a steady, long-term heading.

Today, Türkiye faces mounting external challenges while severe democratic backsliding and the uncertainties surrounding the “terrorless Türkiye” initiative continue to divide the nation. In short, Türkiye stands at an inflection point. It is time for those on the conservative and Islamist side of the political spectrum to reflect on our history and decide whether they align with the historical forces that resisted Atatürk’s achievements, or whether they favor elevating Türkiye into the upper echelon of modern democratic nations.

[i] Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, “Turkey’s Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma”, International Spectator, January March 1992.

[ii]   https://tccb.tr/en/news/542/165878/turkiye-saudi-arabia-and-pakistan-signs-joint-defence-agreement