Idlib Ceasefire: Only a Respite

March 8, 2020

On March 6, Presidents of Russia and Turkey met in Moscow. In remarks to the press before their meeting, President Putin said the situation in Idlib has deteriorated so much that the two leaders needed to have a direct and personal discussion. He added, “As you requested, we are ready to begin our talks one-on-one, and then our colleagues, who are with us in this room, will join us, if necessary.”

Thus, after the talks in restricted format, consultations continued with the participation of the delegations of the two countries. One may conclude, therefore, that the Syrian conflict with its Idlib dimension and the future of Russian-Turkish relations were taken up between the two leaders at full length.

The “Additional Protocol to the Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De-Escalation Area”, probably based on a Russian draft, represents a respite reflecting two sides’ desire to avoid a dramatic downturn in bilateral relations.

With developments such as the Astana process and Turkey’s purchase of S-400 air defense systems, Moscow has successfully driven a wedge in relations between Turkey and its traditional allies. There is no way Russia would forgo this except in case of a 180 degree turn by Ankara.  Again, there is no way Russia would forgo what it has accomplished in Syria following its military intervention. Russia wishes to re-energize the political process and Idlib has now become a nuisance. So, Russia is trying to balance its investment in relations with Ankara with its determination to save the regime and emerge as the major winner in Syria.

As for Ankara, the government can’t possibly afford a major setback in its overall cooperation, particularly economic and trade relations with Russia. These are far more important than what transpires in Idlib. The Turkish government, however, has committed itself to an unwinnable cause in Syria and primarily for domestic reasons needs face-saving compromises along the way towards the exit. Following the Moscow summit, a senior member of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party said the Moscow agreement has paved the way for a political solution to the conflict and Turkey with its resolute stand got what it wanted. Nobody has ever heard such statements from the Russian side.

The Moscow Additional Protocol does not resolve the Idlib conundrum. Turkish leadership had served an ultimatum on the Syrian regime promising severe military punishment if its forces were not to withdraw to lines drawn in the so-called “Sochi agreement” between Russia and Turkey. Obviously, this is not going to happen. Yes, the  parties have undertaken to cease all military actions along the line of contact in the Idlib De-escalation area starting from 00:01 of March 6, 2020, but they have once again expressed “their determination to combat all forms of terrorism, and to eliminate all terrorist groups in Syria as designated by the UNSC, while agreeing that targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure cannot be justified under any pretext”.

As for Damascus, it will suspend, for a while, its military campaign to force Idlib’s Sunni population and the rebels/terrorists out on to Turkish soil.

In brief, the following questions remain unanswered:

  • Are Russia, Iran and the Assad regime determined to eliminate the militants no matter what?
  • If, in theory, the “militants” (in his remarks to the press President Putin called them “criminal gangs”) were to leave Idlib, where would they go?
  • Is there any hope of separating the ‘healthy opposition’ from the ‘terrorists’?”

Now that a respite has been secured with Russia, Ankara has to turn its attention to the West, particularly the EU to win another respite in “the war of refugees” and try to build upon Washington’s recent “generous expressions of support for its NATO ally”.

Since the Russian intervention in Syria, Ankara has been running in a narrow alley between its northern and now southern neighbor and the West. This alley is getting narrower and narrower as we seem to approach the end, just trying to guess what awaits us there.




About Ali Tuygan

Ali Tuygan is a graduate of the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1967. Between various positions in Ankara, he served at the Turkish Embassy in Brussels, NATO International Staff, Turkish Embassies in Washington and Baghdad, and the Turkish Delegation to NATO. From 1986 to 1989 he was the Principal Private Secretary to the President of the Republic. He then served as ambassador to Ottawa, Riyadh, and Athens. In 1997 he was honored with a decoration by the Italian President. Between these assignments abroad he served twice as Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs. In 2004 he was appointed Undersecretary where he remained until the end of 2006 before going to his last foreign assignment as Ambassador to UNESCO. He retired in 2009. In April 2013 he published a book entitled “Gönüllü Diplomat, Dışişlerinde Kırk Yıl” (“Diplomat by Choice, Forty Years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”) in which he elaborated on the diplomatic profession and the main issues on the global agenda. He has published articles in Turkish periodicals and newspapers.
This entry was posted in Uncategorized and tagged , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s