What After the Rafah Offensive?

May 6, 2024

The UAE was the first Arab country to sign the Abraham Accords in 2020 normalizing relations with Israel. Later Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco followed suit. Washington then started encouraging Saudi Arabia to join the group. In July 2022,  Riyadh announced that it would open its airspace to all airlines, paving the way for more overflights to and from Israel. The normalization of Israel-Saudi Arabia relations appeared close. What led these countries to seek better relations with Israel was their desire to benefit from its advanced technological achievements in multiple fields and broaden the front against Iran and its Axis of Resistance. After all, Islamic solidarity is a myth, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is a non-entity. Nonetheless, while signing the Accords they did not fail to pay lip service to the Palestinian cause. In reality, the question of Palestine was swept under the carpet for dynastic/national interest.

The Hamas onslaught of October 7 dramatically changed the picture marking the beginning of Israel’s longest war. Considering the misery, subjugation, and deprivation in Gaza, next to one of the world’s most prosperous and advanced countries, and growing international apathy toward the Palestinian question, a local outburst was only to be expected. However, the acts of revolting violence committed by some during the attack rallied the West solidly behind Israel. The onslaught was condemned in the strongest possible language and Israel’s right to defend itself was given unequivocal support.

Later, the ferocity of the Israeli military campaign, the increasing number of civilian casualties, among them thousands and thousands of women and children, and the devastation of the Strip gradually led to a change in Western public discourse. In other words, in the world’s opinion, both Hamas and the IDF have committed war crimes in Gaza, but while the former is a militant group and the latter the regular army of a democratic state enjoying highly advanced military capabilities, its crimes were more troubling. Thus, with little progress in ceasefire talks “humanitarian assistance” and “ceasefire” became principal topics, the latter with endless qualifications.

With the slowing down of Israel’s military operations and lower numbers of daily casualties among Gazans, these became the center of focus. Despite the existence of land routes, the building of a pier was introduced as a major project underlining the US commitment to overcoming the risk of famine in Gaza. Secretary Blinken visited the region seven times, lastly over the past week. CIA Director William Burns went to Qatar several times for hostage release talks. The US started publicly counseling Prime Minister Netanyahu to refrain from an operation against Rafah.

On April 24, President Biden signed into law the national security package that was finally passed by Congress after months of delay. The foreign aid package allocates some $26.38bn for Israel, including $9.1bn for humanitarian needs.

In remarks to the press, Mr. Biden repeated his ironclad support for Israel and said that the bill “significantly increases humanitarian assistance we’re sending to the innocent people of Gaza, who are suffering badly.  They’re suffering the consequences of this war that Hamas started.  And we’ve been working intently for months to get as much aid to Gaza as possible.”

Thus, the war in Gaza entered its seventh month with no dramatic change on the ground. Notably, Gaza no longer makes the headlines in the West like it did during the first three months following the Hamas onslaught. One hears less and less about the two-state solution which the current Israeli government strongly objects. The only worthwhile local news of the past week was Mr. Netanyahu reiterating over and over again that the IDF will launch its long-anticipated military operation in Rafah regardless of a cease-fire and hostage deal with Hamas. And Secretary Blinken has repeatedly said during the past week that the only obstacle before a hostage deal is Hamas. He also said, “… if there is an agreement, if we get the initial ceasefire, if we get the hostages home, we’ll work to build on that…”[i] It seems that this was not enough for Hamas, but the talks would continue.

Although the details of the talks in Qatar are not public knowledge, it is clear that Israel and the US are insisting on an as comprehensive as possible hostage-prisoner exchange deal and a temporary ceasefire. Such an agreement would give Israel the possibility to launch an operation against Rafah soon after the hostage-prisoner exchange. Hamas seems ready to release all hostages, except the Israeli soldiers, but only under the condition of a permanent ceasefire. Perhaps, what happens with the hostages is not Mr. Netanyahu’s top priority. It is to emerge as the victor of the “final episode” of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In other words, at some point the IDF will attack Rafah and the timing of the attack would probably take into consideration the fact that the next US presidential election is to be held on November 5, 2024, exactly six months from now.

Once the IDF invades Rafah, the question would then be how the people of Gaza would survive with no housing, no sanitation, no water, no functioning hospitals, and little food. One solution likely to be advanced by Israel and the West could be giving Gazans “temporary shelter” in neighboring countries until such a time when the Strip would again become a livable stretch of land. That could take years. In the meantime, thousands and thousands of Gazans will no doubt try to migrate to foreign lands for a better life.

Türkiye is not a “neighboring country”, but it has to be ready for all scenarios. Since October 7, President Erdogan has been the leading critic of Israel and the leading supporter of Hamas in the world. Last week Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan said that Ankara will join South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at World Court. Again, last week, Ankara suspended all trade with Israel. Given Türkiye’s “spectacular economic performance” in recent years, the cost of this move must be negligible. But if the Turkish leadership believes that political relations and trade with Israel would immediately be resumed after a government change in Israel, it must be daydreaming.

Moreover, disappointing many Turks for whom the War of Independence remains the most glorious page in our history, Mr. Erdogan likened Hamas to the “National Militia” (Kuvayi Milliye), groups of Turkish patriots who had started fighting the victors of the First World War immediately after the Ottoman surrender. Later, they became part of the National Army under the command of Ataturk. This is how the world-renowned Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet Ran described the chivalrous warriors of the War of Independence and what they fought and died for:

“To the left, at a distance stands Corporal Ali,
His face and eyes smeared in blood.
A cavalry platoon passes by, in full gallop.
[… and Ali] hears this song:

“Galloping, full speed, from Far Asia
and jutting out into the Mediterranean like a mare’s head
this country is ours.
Wrists smeared in blood, clenched teeth, barefoot
the soil that spreads like a silk rug,
this hell, this heaven is ours.

“Close all doors to intruders, never open them again,
stop man’s servitude to man,
this call is ours…

“To live, like a tree, alone and free
and in brotherhood like a forest,
this yearning is ours…”

Unfortunately, for the people of Türkiye, the yearning remains unfulfilled. Consequently, our top priority has to be our internal peace, an enlightened and prosperous future for our country, not a sterile Islamist agenda.

As I said in an earlier post, a balanced approach to the war in Gaza would not have prevented Ankara from calling on Israel for restraint in its bombing of Gaza, criticizing Tel Aviv for its disregard for civilians, and calling for a permanent ceasefire. This would have allowed Ankara to engage with other countries with similar concerns. It would have kept our lines of communication open with Israel, the US, and European countries. It would have made Türkiye a dialogue partner for the resolution of the Palestinian question.

Instead, President Erdogan chose exactly the opposite path. Looking around the region, I cannot help wondering what others, especially our brothers in Azerbaijan think about the AKP government’s extreme anti-Israel stand.

So, one would not be surprised if Ankara were to be approached by the West to give Gazans “temporary shelter” in Türkiye with promises of generous financial support for their stay, as well as incentives such as a role in the rebuilding of Gaza.

In such an eventuality, the Turkish government should bear in mind that,

  • firstly, as we have come to learn bitterly, there is no such thing as a “temporary stay”, whoever comes stays for good;
  • secondly, the removal of Gazans from the Strip under any pretext will mark the end of whatever is left of the “Palestinian cause”. Judging by Ankara’s current public discourse, this would be tantamount to betrayal;
  • thirdly, with the government’s disastrous involvement in the regime change project in Syria and the consequent open-door policy to migration from all directions, Türkiye is now among the top countries of the world with the largest number of migrants, with more than five million Syrians and more than a million Afghans,  not the mention the others. Thus, Türkiye is no longer in a position to open its doors to anyone;
  • and lastly, if such projects involving Türkiye were to be launched, even in a limited scope, then Mr. Netanyahu, the political chess grandmaster, would look us straight in the eye and say “Checkmate”.

[i] https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-andrea-mitchell-of-nbc-3/

About Ali Tuygan

Ali Tuygan is a graduate of the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1967. Between various positions in Ankara, he served at the Turkish Embassy in Brussels, NATO International Staff, Turkish Embassies in Washington and Baghdad, and the Turkish Delegation to NATO. From 1986 to 1989 he was the Principal Private Secretary to the President of the Republic. He then served as ambassador to Ottawa, Riyadh, and Athens. In 1997 he was honored with a decoration by the Italian President. Between these assignments abroad he served twice as Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs. In 2004 he was appointed Undersecretary where he remained until the end of 2006 before going to his last foreign assignment as Ambassador to UNESCO. He retired in 2009. In April 2013 he published a book entitled “Gönüllü Diplomat, Dışişlerinde Kırk Yıl” (“Diplomat by Choice, Forty Years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”) in which he elaborated on the diplomatic profession and the main issues on the global agenda. He has published articles in Turkish periodicals and newspapers.
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