April 13, 2026
Last Tuesday, Washington and Tehran agreed, through Pakistan’s mediation, to stop fighting for two weeks. The term used to define the “agreement” was “ceasefire,” often accompanied by the adjective “temporary.” Another word that goes a step beyond “ceasefire” is “armistice,” which refers to a formal agreement between two countries at war to stop fighting for a specific time to negotiate peace. Definitely, the parties in this Middle East war are far from that point.
Last week’s announcements from the White House and Tehran brought some relief, but were soon complicated by statements reflecting different understandings and interpretations of the agreement regarding talks. Thus, the word “pause” might be a better term to describe what was agreed upon between the parties.
In a post two days after the Israeli-US attacks on Iran, I said:
“Since the 1979 revolution, the people of Iran have lived under oppressive Islamist tyranny. The country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, remained in power for 37 years. The regime miserably failed to deliver peace, stability, and higher living standards to Iranians. Even the most cautious attempts for reform by a few led nowhere. The regime’s reaction to political protests was massacres. Its regional ambitions overstepped the bounds of reason. On the international scene, it had few friends, if any. Consequently, Iran became a vulnerable state.”
With due respect to the people of Iran, their history, their culture, and them being the inheritors of a great civilization, many have, over the years, broadly shared the same negative view of the regime.
However, since the February 1st Israeli-US attacks, the picture has changed. With Trump’s conflicting remarks, his threats, his expletive-laden language, his changes of direction from one day to the next, the aggressiveness of his Secretary of War, the ferocity of the air campaign against Iran, and the Israeli attacks on Lebanon that have resulted in a high number of civilian casualties, the “new regime” in Tehran has won considerable support in the international community and the regime opponents were left with no other choice than rallying behind it.
Without the Israeli-US attacks, none of this could have happened.
By contrast, many countries are extremely upset about the multiple challenges they are confronted with as a result of the Israel-US attacks on Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Global trust in US leadership is further weakened. Gulf countries, which have invested heavily in their relationship with Trump and followed his lead in improving relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords, are now in shock at being hit by Iranian missiles, eroding their confidence in US-provided security. American consumers are also suffering the negative impact of the war on the US economy.
In Islamabad, the Iranian side was headed by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a prominent non-clerical figure who unsuccessfully ran for president of Iran in 2005, 2013, and 2024.[i] He was accompanied by Foreign Minister Araghchi, an experienced diplomat, with a full command of the issues involved.
The US side was led by Vice President JD Vance, accompanied by Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, both personal representatives of Trump. It seems that, beyond the latter two, Trump was also involved in the talks, and Vance said that he spoke with him anywhere from a “half dozen” to “dozen times” during the 21-hour marathon negotiations.
How the level of the Islamabad talks was decided is unclear. If Trump was told that Ghalibaf would represent Iran at the talks, then he must have felt obliged to task Vance to negotiate with him. If not, why Vance and not Rubio? Reportedly, Rubio also had some questions about Netanyahu’s plans, but generally, Vance was more opposed to getting involved in new Middle East wars. So, was Trump after making a positive impression on the Iranian side, or did he want his Vice President to understand that war was the only option in dealing with the regime in Tehran? Perhaps both.[ii]
An even bigger question is, why did Trump send Vance to Budapest to voice his administration’s support for Orban, thus intervening in Hungary’s domestic affairs? And why did Vance agree to go there, knowing that Orban’s chances for re-election after sixteen years in office were slim?
By agreeing to a pause in the fighting and to talks in Islamabad, both Iran and the US have shown a certain willingness for de-escalation because Iran, despite its resilience, has already suffered unprecedented devastation, and Trump, with mid-term elections in November, knows that the majority of the Americans and the international community want to see an end to the war and the resumption of energy supplies which would take months even under the best circumstances.
Before he departed from Pakistan, Vance said that Iran chose not to accept American terms, including an agreement not to build nuclear weapons. Since Iran has continuously underlined its intention not to build nuclear weapons, the disagreement must be over Iran’s uranium enrichment and its civilian nuclear program. Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman said that no one expected to reach an agreement in a single session. It seems that the US side was prepared to move forward on the question of Iran sanctions.
A must-read New York Times article titled “How Trump Took the U.S. to War With Iran” has confirmed that it was Netanyahu who convinced Trump to go to war with Iran.[iii]
Clearly, Netanyahu would prefer the continuation of the war, and to what extent he can continue to influence Trump’s choices from now on remains to be seen. However, if held as planned, the Lebanon-Israel talks to start this week in Washington would be no more than diplomatic theatre.
Trump’s decision to impose a blockade on the Strait of Hormuz does not rule out a second round of talks between Iran and the US. It probably means that Washington does not wish to allow Tehran to send even limited amounts of oil to selected countries. Thus, the question now is whether the two-week “pause” would continue, the alternative being further military escalation.
The war in Iran has turned into a source of frustration for Trump. Tisza Party’s election victory in Hungary will only make it worse.
[i] https://thehill.com/policy/international/5796830-mohammad-bagher-ghalibaf-iran-negotiator/
[ii] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/04/11/vance-war-skeptic-peace-talks/
[iii] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/07/us/politics/trump-iran-war.html?smid=em-share
Diplomatic Opinion - Ali Tuygan 