April 6, 2026

As recent polls in the US show, the majority of Americans oppose sending US ground troops into Iran and wish Washington to end the war quickly, even if that means not achieving the goals set out by the Trump administration.

In his Address to the Nation, last Wednesday, the increasingly frustrated US President said:

“Thanks to the progress we’ve made, I can say tonight that we are on track to complete all of America’s military objectives shortly, very shortly. We are going to hit them extremely hard. Over the next two to three weeks, we’re going to bring them back to the Stone Age, where they belong.”

Yesterday, he again thundered, triggering a discussion about war crimes.[i] Reporting what he said on his Truth Social platform, the BBC issued a Warning: “The below post contains very strong, uncensored language that some may find offensive.”

Trump’s threats perfectly define Netanyahu’s war aim in Iran: destruction.

Last Friday, Javad Zarif—who previously served as Iran’s Vice President, Foreign Minister, and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and was Iran’s chief negotiator of the JCPoA—proposed a peace deal in a Foreign Affairs op-ed.[ii]

The world, in particular, the signatories of the JCPoA (China, France, Russia, the UK, and Germany) must pay attention to what Zarif says.

Unfortunately, however, the Iran war is unlikely to end with a “formal ceasefire” or an agreement under which Israel and the US would promise not to launch further attacks on Iran. This week may witness escalation, with lasting peace remaining far away.

Currently, the world is confronted with huge challenges arising from wars. Gaza is already back in the Stone Age. Destruction in Lebanon and Iran continues. Energy and food security are becoming significant problems for economies worldwide. With the war in Ukraine, Europe is no longer enjoying the post-Cold War security and stability. Transatlantic relations are under growing stress due to conflicting interests and Trump’s threats to withdraw from the Alliance.

Withdrawal from NATO isn’t something Trump can do as easily as the withdrawal from the JCPoA. Section 1250A of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 states that: “The President shall not suspend, terminate, denounce, or withdraw the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty, done at Washington, DC, April 4, 1949, except by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided that two-thirds of the Senators present concur, or pursuant to an Act of Congress.”[iii]

Thus, there is no chance for Trump to push such a decision through Congress easily.

In brief, as NATO partners, the Trump administration and Europe will have to put up with each other until the next US presidential election on November 7, 2028. However, until then, transatlantic relations may face new crises and shocks; Trump may contribute less to NATO security and repatriate some of the American troops currently stationed in Europe.

President Putin’s initial plan was to invade the entire Ukraine in a blitzkrieg, at least, cut it off from the Black Sea. The project failed.  Does this represent a victory for Ukraine? In terms of the resilience against aggression, “definitely yes”, but at great cost.

This is why Ukraine’s history could—and should—have been written differently. The West and Russia should have tried harder to avoid war and engage in intense diplomacy. Unfortunately, all the Biden administration seemed to care about was keeping Russia bogged down in a conflict, and the European powers just followed suit.

In recent years, the EU has repeatedly stated that a comprehensive peace agreement needs to be accompanied by robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine to help deter future Russian aggression.

They have also said, “Peace must respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.”  The reference to “respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity” must refer to the post-conflict order, since it is clear Ukraine will lose some territory under any deal. Considering Russia’s original plans, however, this would fall short of a “total victory”.

Regardless of their strong anti-Russian public discourse and accompanying sanctions, European countries would prefer peace in Ukraine over continued confrontation with Moscow. This is why Macron and Meloni have, on occasion, called for resuming dialogue with Russia, and the Kremlin has responded positively. However, there has been no follow-up.

In the late 1960’ and the 1970’, East-West relations experienced a period of détente.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 brought the two superpowers of the day, the US and the Soviet Union, to the brink of nuclear conflict. The former had been exhausted and polarized by the Vietnam War. The latter faced economic stagnation and a growing technological gap with the West while maintaining costly commitments to Eastern Europe and the Third World. Thus, by the late 1960s, both powers were looking for ways to reduce tensions.

In February 1972, President Nixon traveled to China and met with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, initiating a rapprochement between the two countries. He was after using the China-Soviet split to gain leverage over both.

Two months later, Nixon became the first US President to visit Russia since the Second World War. The visit resulted in the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) on May 26, 1972. The Soviet Union needed to reduce tensions with the West to guard against potential conflict with China.

The US withdrew its last combat troops from Vietnam on March 29, 1973. In June of that year, Brezhnev returned Nixon’s visit. Meanwhile, Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik created the conditions for broader détente. Consequently, the East and the West began to discuss the idea of establishing a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation. After two years of talks, the Helsinki Final Act was formally signed on August 1, 1975. Eventually, the process evolved into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

At the end of December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The invasion negatively impacted the process of détente. A decade later, under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. To their later disappointment, many believed that the Cold War was finally over.

Russia and Europe don’t need another world war to reinvent détente. During the past four years, the parties that have suffered the most politically, economically, and security-wise from the Ukraine war are Ukraine, Russia, and the European countries, making a resumed dialogue the dictate of the day. What is difficult to understand, as I noted in a recent post, is that while the war is in Europe, European countries aren’t at the negotiation table—but Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are.

European countries must accept that the war won’t end on their terms. Similarly, the Kremlin, with a long-term perspective, should focus on restoring political and economic ties with Europe rather than the narrow objective of territorial gain in Ukraine. This doesn’t mean Europe should disengage from its relationship with Washington or follow the Trump administration’s example of ignoring it. Nor should Europe forget its NATO commitments. The main point is that, at this stage, restarting dialogue with Russia is the only way to a better future for the continent.

Türkiye isn’t involved in the war in Iran. Unfortunately, however, the AKP government is engaged in a domestic war against the municipalities of the main opposition party, the CHP, further damaging the image of “Turkish democracy” at a time when we are set to host a critical NATO summit.

Türkiye has always been a solid member of the NATO Alliance, its single forum of dialogue with the West. It is worth remembering that following the shooting down of a Russian Sukhoi Su-24M attack aircraft near the Syria–Turkey border, on November 24, 2015, the Turkish prime minister of the time rushed to Brussels for allied support.[iv]

With the East-West détente, Türkiye also enjoyed a well-defined, transparent, and mutually advantageous relationship with Russia. Ankara should remain on the same path.

Since Türkiye borders conflict areas, our relations with neighbors need to be based on mutual trust and mutual advantage to the greatest extent possible. With the region in turmoil, the current state of our relations with Middle Eastern neighbors is somewhat unclear, but we can at least improve relations with others. The long-delayed normalization of relations with Armenia would be a timely step forward in that direction.

[i] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/05/us/politics/trump-iran-war-crimes-truth-social.html?smid=em-share

[ii] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/how-iran-should-end-war

[iii] https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/2670/text

[iv] https://diplomaticopinion.com/2015/12/16/downing-of-russian-su-24-the-nato-dimension/