March 20, 2026

Today marks a somber double anniversary in Middle Eastern history: 23 years since the 2003 invasion of Iraq and 15 years since the UK, US, and French intervention against Muammar Gaddafi’s forces in Libya. Years later, the region is not the beacon of stability once promised; instead, it is engulfed in an even more expansive and destructive conflict. As German Foreign Minister Wadephul remarked two days ago, “One thing is clear: We are living through an exceptional moment in history.”[i]

During the months before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Turkish government came under intense pressure from Washington for “full cooperation” which extended from the opening of ports, airports, and military bases to US troops, navy, and air force to the transit through Türkiye of tens of thousands of American troops into Iraq, and the deployment of thousands more in Türkiye across the border with Iraq.

I remember a senior US State Department official telling us in Ankara, during those challenging days, that with political stability, Iraq would experience rapid economic growth, that people from poor Arab countries would go there to work, creating a bridge between Iraq and their countries, and expanding democracy’s outreach across the region.

That “vision” never materialized. The Turkish Parliament’s decision to offer only limited cooperation caused lasting friction with Washington. Six weeks into the invasion, President Bush famously declared, “Mission Accomplished,” yet few shared his optimism.

The following is a key paragraph from “The Modern History of Iraq” by Phebe Marr:

“Without substantial international support and lacking in understanding of Iraq or clear planning for Iraq’s future, the decision by the United States to occupy Iraq was fraught with dangers. Toppling Saddam proved easy and swift, but replacing the government and the political and social institutions that underpinned the regime was a long, difficult, and costly process – for both the United States and Iraq. The initial attack, followed by unchecked looting and the ill-advised dismantling of the political and military structures, created widespread destruction and a political and social vacuum, which foreign personnel proved unable to replace. Iraq soon began to fracture into ethnic and sectarian components.”[ii]

Allegations that the invasion of Iraq was launched under false premises continued for years. Thus, in 2009, a British public inquiry into the nation’s role in the Iraq War was announced by Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

Seven years later, on July 6, 2016, Sir John Chilcot, chairman of the inquiry, recapitulated the conclusions of the Inquiry as follows:

•          The judgments about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction – WMD – were presented with a certainty that was not justified.

•          Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate.

•          The Government failed to achieve its stated objectives.

None of the foregoing broke new ground. Many countries had long ago reached the same conclusions. The Report only substantiated them.

The Libyan story was somewhat different.

Gaddafi’s violent reaction to the Arab Spring protests and his unbalanced statements gave the West an opportunity. Under those circumstances, France, the UK, and the US could immediately present a draft resolution to the Security Council. However, the lessons from the Iraq and Afghanistan military interventions led them to seek other instruments of international legitimacy to pave the way.

Thus, the Arab League was persuaded to adopt a resolution that asked the UN Security Council to declare a “no-fly zone” over Libya. This was essentially an act of self-defense to show that the Arab League countries advocated democratic change, at least in Libya. The African Union and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation condemned Gaddafi for the violence.

On 18 March 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, which demanded an immediate ceasefire and an end to all violence; called for political reforms to find a peaceful and sustainable solution; authorized member states to take all necessary measures to protect civilians while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory; and banned on all flights in Libyan airspace.

On 19 March 2011, a day after the adoption of Resolution 1973, a conference in Paris, held under French, British, and US leadership, decided to start air operations against Qaddafi’s forces to protect the civilians. Within hours, air strikes began. It soon became clear that the purpose was regime change.

The force with which these operations were conducted caused discomfort in Arab capitals since they had expected that Russia and China would veto Resolution 1973, whereas both abstained. It is worth recalling that Brazil, India, and Germany also abstained.

One may fairly say that Resolution 1973 went beyond what the Arab League intended, and its implementation went far beyond its letter and spirit.

In the past two weeks, many observers looking at Trump’s turns and twists, and his conflicting remarks, have criticized his inability to put forward a coherent strategy and offer a clear endgame for the military campaign. This is nothing new. In the case of Iraq also, there were many similar questions: “Why did the Bush administration decide to invade Iraq?”, “What were its motives?”, “What were the expected benefits?”

The answer to these questions is that the US’s Middle East policy is not determined in Washington but in Tel Aviv.  Yesterday, the Secretary of War Hegseth said that Europeans should thank Trump. Actually, if there is anything to be grateful for, thanks must go to Netanyahu.

The invasion of Iraq was the first step of a scheme to weaken the Arab core consisting of Iraq and Syria. The second step was regime change in Syria. Today, Iraq and Syria are no longer their former selves. During Trump’s first term in office, relations between Israel and the Gulf kingdoms improved dramatically. This left Iran and its Axis of Resistance as the only security challenge for Israel. Thus, Netanyahu successfully convinced Trump to join him in a second wave of attack on Iran to ensure Israel’s supremacy over the Middle East.

Is the Iran war about regime change? Not really, because installing a regime friendly to the US and Israel after a devastating war is a chimera. For Netanyahu, the destruction of Iran’s military capabilities, its nuclear program, and its administrative and economic infrastructure to such an extent that Tehran would not pose a threat to Israel for decades is a more realistic option. Internal conflict in Iran would also serve his purpose. As the war in Gaza has shown, civilian loss of life is not an issue for him. And this is exactly what Israel is doing in Iran, not to mention the free hand it now enjoys in Lebanon. The strains in transatlantic relations are the least of his worries.

Nonetheless, one should admit that Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu deserve credit for having steered Washington’s Middle East policy to serve their ends.

For Ankara, the path forward must be one of caution. As a regional country, Türkiye must avoid entanglement in a war that will haunt the Middle East for generations to come.

[i] https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/2760294-2760294

[ii]Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, Westview Press, 2012, p.257.