The Munich Security Conference

February 18, 2026

The 62nd  Munich Security Conference took place from February 13 to 15, 2026. With the war in Ukraine and strains in transatlantic relations, the conference attracted global attention. Starting with Chancellor Merz, as the leader of the host country, many other European leaders, Secretary of State Rubio, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi addressed the meeting. All Western participants who delivered remarks agreed that the so-called “international rules-based order” has ceased to exist. They also agreed that if there had been a unipolar moment following the collapse of the USSR, with the rise of China, that too was over.

Having been shocked by US Vice-President Vance’s remarks on the “decline of Europe” at the 61st Munich Security Conference, European participants were somewhat happier with Secretary of State Rubio’s address this year.[i]

Nonetheless, Rubio’s message reflected the same fundamental understanding. He mentioned the outsourcing of sovereignty to international institutions, while many nations invested in massive welfare states at the cost of maintaining the ability to defend themselves, and this happened even as other countries invested in the most rapid military buildup in all of human history and have not hesitated to use hard power to pursue their own interests.

He also said that in the pursuit of a world without borders, the West opened its doors to an unprecedented wave of mass migration that threatens the cohesion of Western societies, the continuity of Western culture, and the future of Western peoples. He then added, “We made these mistakes together, and now, together, we owe it to our people to face those facts and to move forward, to rebuild.”

“Under President Trump,” Rubio said, the US will once again take on the task of renewal and restoration, driven by a vision of a future as proud, as sovereign, and as vital as Western civilization’s past. And while the US is prepared to do this alone, it is Washington’s preference and hope to do it together with friends in Europe. And he drew applause from the audience when he said America’s destiny is and will always be intertwined with Europe’s, because the fate of Europe will never be irrelevant to America’s own.

Referring to the fall of the Berlin Wall, he said: “That infamous wall that had cleaved this nation into two came down, and with it an evil empire, and the East and West became one again. But the euphoria of this triumph led us to a dangerous delusion: that we had entered, quote, ‘the end of history;’ that every nation would now be a liberal democracy; that the ties formed by trade and by commerce alone would now replace nationhood; that the rules-based global order – an overused term – would now replace the national interest; and that we would now live in a world without borders where everyone became a citizen of the world.” (emphasis added)

Since Washington appears committed to having a working relationship with Moscow, ending the war in Ukraine, and isolating China, one wonders what kind of reaction the reference to the “evil empire” may have created at the Kremlin.

Thus, the questions facing Europe remain as before:

  • How to energize the European economy?
  • How to boost Europe’s defense capability, including nuclear deterrence?
  • How to become a stronger global player through further centralization of the EU’s governance?
  • How to manage relations with the unpredictable Trump White House for another three years?
  • How to ensure greater participation for Europe in the endeavor to bring the Ukraine war to an end?
  • And, how to manage relations with Russia?

None of these questions will receive a convincing answer in the foreseeable future. And since it appears that European countries, perhaps except for Germany and a few others, are unlikely to invest heavily in defense, resuming dialogue with Moscow could be an option, as I will elaborate further below.

At the last two Munich Security Conferences, both Vance and Rubio strongly criticized Europe’s attitude toward the “threat of migration.” Looking at the demographic trends in Europe, they clearly see this as a civilizational challenge. Nonetheless, could the top two members of Trump’s Team of Three, with the third being the Secretary of War, Hegseth, be completely ignorant of Europe’s colonial past and what a tragedy this era still is for the native peoples? I guess not. However, Europe now seems to be heeding their advice on the fight against migration, as a New York Times report titled “The Migrants Detained at the ‘End of the World’” reveals.[ii]

Would the picture have been the same had Atatürk’s secular reforms been adopted by the other Muslim countries, if radical jihadism had not become a threat across the broad Middle East and Africa, and had they not been conveniently used by Western powers? Possibly no.

In Munich, Merz said that the so-called “rules-based order” ended with the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, if not before.” [iii]

Such references always prompt me to ask if history could have been written differently, and if the war in Ukraine, which is a European war, could have been avoided.

In the mid-1970s, I served at NATO’s International Staff, and in the mid-1980s at the Turkish Delegation in Brussels. During my former posting in Brussels, NATO had 15 members. In the latter one, with Spain’s joining the Alliance, the number had gone up to 16. At the time, every two months, the NATO Secretariat published a periodical titled “NATO’s Sixteen Nations.”

Mikhail Gorbachev was the General Secretary of the Communist Party from 1985 to 1991. He set out to reform the Soviet Union but eventually witnessed its collapse. His years in power were characterized by two terms: “glasnost” and “perestroika.” He was engaged in a series of talks with President Ronald Reagan but had a more cordial relationship with his successor, President George H. W. Bush. He enjoyed genuine dialogue with prominent European leaders.

Gorbachev’s objectives included the restructuring of the economy, a genuine partnership with the West, and keeping the Soviet republics together under a “Union Treaty.” For economic revival, he desperately needed Western economic support—perhaps a second Marshall Plan. His overly high expectations for economic support were not fulfilled, and the republics determinedly opted for independence.

In brief, Gorbachev, while emerging as an open-minded, reformist, peace-seeking, and thus admired leader for the West, failed to meet the expectations of the peoples of the Soviet Union, including the Russians. Thus, Boris Yeltsin, who prioritized Russianism and openly endorsed the other republics’ desire for independence, succeeded him.

On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned and turned over his presidential powers to Yeltsin, who became the first president of the Russian Federation. The Soviet Union was replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Cold War ended.

However, Moscow’s desire for a genuine partnership with the West continued. At the time, Yeltsin’s close advisor and State Secretary Burbulis met with NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner and repeated what he had earlier told President Mitterrand: that Russian reformers were decisively considering the possibility of joining NATO as part of their primary mission to remove all conditions for confrontation. Wörner was shocked and said, “You are such an enormous country. I cannot imagine under what configuration this may become reality.” Eventually, Russia joined the NATO Cooperation Council (NACC).[iv]

Professor Vladislav M. Zubok’s must-read book, titled “Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union,” offers remarkable insight into the developments of the era.

In March 1999, in the first wave of NATO enlargement, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined the Alliance.

On December 31, 1999, at the end of eight years of continuing failures, Boris Yeltsin announced his resignation. Vladimir Putin took the helm.

In March 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—and in April 2009, Albania and Croatia—began flying their flags at the NATO Headquarters.

In February and March 2014, in a warning to the West about the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO, Russia invaded Crimea and then annexed it.

In June 2017, Montenegro and, in March 2020, North Macedonia also joined the Alliance. Thus, during the two decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of NATO allies increased from 16 to 30.

On December 17, 2021, the Russian Foreign Ministry made public a draft treaty between Russia and the US. It also made public a draft agreement between Russia and member states of NATO. Both of these had been delivered to the US side at a meeting of diplomats. The same day, Russia announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on Open Skies. On December 23, President Putin held his annual press conference. He had strong words for Ukraine. In response to a question, he said, “We remember, as I have mentioned many times before and as you know very well, how you promised us in the 1990s that [NATO] would not move an inch to the East…”[v]

It was too late to rewrite the developments of the past decade. As expected, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. After three years of fighting, the loss of thousands of lives, and devastation, this has now turned into a grinding war. Russia could not achieve a sweeping military victory, but it is now determined to achieve one at the negotiation table. This latest European war brought Finland into the Alliance in 2023 and Sweden in 2024. Thus, in two decades, the number of NATO members doubled.

Joining an alliance is the right of every independent state, as many former Soviet republics did. This is also Ukraine’s right. However, the evolution of history, perceptions of the future in failing major powers, the fundamental shifts in global strategic balance, and the realities of the day sometimes make it imperative to look for alternatives. Had this been done in the case of Ukraine, perhaps a violation of international law,  and this latest European war could have been avoided. The tragedy is that whatever peace formula is agreed upon, Ukraine will lose territory and never become a member of NATO.

It seems that the calls by President Macron and Prime Minister Meloni for resuming dialogue with Russia have led to some disagreement. The following, on the strategic implications of the attack on Venezuela, is from the remarks delivered by Ambassador Chas Freeman, my American colleague in Riyadh, in the early 1990s:

“In this regard, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni is entirely right to make the commonsense argument that peace in Europe demands that Europeans talk to Russia, not just among themselves and to Ukraine. Like it or not, Russia is part of Europe. Without dialogue with Russia about the warfare that threatens Europe and is consuming Ukraine, Europeans cannot resolve the conflict or protect their long-term security interests. The United States is no longer able or willing to do this for them. It is surely anomalous that Europeans should entrust the crafting of a peace that is central to their subcontinent’s stability to amateur envoys of an American president who says he regards them as competitors and who seems to have little interest in them except as wealthy purchasers of American weaponry.

“Russian statecraft is dominated by memories of foreign invasion from both the east and west. Moscow’s security anxieties are not irrational. Both France and Germany have invaded Russia. Any peace in Europe must address both Russian anxieties about another Western attack on it, especially as Germany rearms, and Western concerns about Russia. Europeans need to take charge of defining their own destiny. They – non-Russian and Russian alike – are the parties directly at interest in composing a mutually reassuring security architecture for their subcontinent. Prime Minister Meloni deserves the support of other European leaders in a joint effort to engage Russia in dialogue about how peace in Ukraine might help bring forth such an architecture.”[vi]

As for Türkiye, in Munich, Chancellor Merz mentioned the need for Europe to extend partnerships. He said, “So we reach out to new partners with whom we share not all but many objectives. This avoids dependencies and risks, and at the same time, it opens up new opportunities for both sides. It protects our freedom. Canada and Japan, Turkey, India, or Brazil will play a key role in this, as do South Africa, the Gulf states, and others.”

Canada is a NATO member across the Atlantic and tensions between Ottawa and Washington may explain a specific reference.

However, Merz’s grouping of Türkiye with “India, Brazil, South Africa, the Gulf states, and others” is significant. Some in Turkey mention Türkiye’s strategic location, its growing significance for European defense, and its developing defense industry to draw a promising picture for the future. They overlook our democratic decline, economic woes, and our increasingly being identified with the Middle East. Chancellor Merz’s grouping only shows that Ankara’s relations with Europe will be a “transactional” one, and not a robust strategic partnership as required between allies.


[i] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/02/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-at-the-munich-security-conference/

[ii] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/10/magazine/immigration-detention-europe-busmantsi-bulgaria.html

[iii] https://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/frie/friedrich-merz-remarks-at-msc-2026-.pdf

[iv] Vladislav M. Zubok, “Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union,” (Yale University Press, 2022), 410.

[v] https://diplomaticopinion.com/2022/01/03/russia-proposes-a-new-security-architecture-in-europe-and-beyond/

[vi] https://chasfreeman.net/the-strategic-implications-of-the-attack-on-venezuela/

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About Ali Tuygan

Ali Tuygan is a graduate of the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1967. Between various positions in Ankara, he served at the Turkish Embassy in Brussels, NATO International Staff, Turkish Embassies in Washington and Baghdad, and the Turkish Delegation to NATO. From 1986 to 1989 he was the Principal Private Secretary to the President of the Republic. He then served as ambassador to Ottawa, Riyadh, and Athens. In 1997 he was honored with a decoration by the Italian President. Between these assignments abroad he served twice as Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs. In 2004 he was appointed Undersecretary where he remained until the end of 2006 before going to his last foreign assignment as Ambassador to UNESCO. He retired in 2009. In April 2013 he published a book entitled “Gönüllü Diplomat, Dışişlerinde Kırk Yıl” (“Diplomat by Choice, Forty Years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”) in which he elaborated on the diplomatic profession and the main issues on the global agenda. He has published articles in Turkish periodicals and newspapers.
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