January 19, 2026
The anti-regime protests in Iran were the top development of global attention over the past weeks. In the background was the nature of the Iranian regime, its controversial and confrontational regional outreach, which, to a large extent, resulted from the US invasion of Iraq, the Syrian conflict, regional rivalries, and the failure of the Iran nuclear deal. The last one compelled me to look back at the past.
Iran is a country with an impressive historical and cultural heritage. It has oil, other natural resources, a strategic location, and today, a population of 92.8 million with a median age of 34.
Following the ouster of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979, Iran’s principal concerns were ensuring the regime’s survival and exporting the Revolution. Türkiye was a particular target. However, this did not close all doors to cooperation. Turkey maintained its political dialogue and economic links with Iran as a neighbor. Ankara followed a policy of “active neutrality” during the eight-year Iraq-Iran war and gained the trust of both sides.
The West continued to hope for internal reform. There was optimism when President Muhammad Khatami was elected in 1997, winning nearly 70 percent of the popular vote; however, the regime did not meet his expectations. With the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric reached new heights. Ahmadinejad was re-elected in 2009. Election irregularities and the repression of the opposition marred his final four years in office. In the meantime, Western sanctions and the resulting economic hardship continued to take their toll.
In the 2012 presidential elections, Hassan Rouhani was elected with a very carefully worded program of change. His administration’s first major foreign policy initiative was to display a readiness to resolve the nuclear issue. The President and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif appeared to agree that confrontation with the West over the nuclear program was doing more harm than good to Iran, and that the Obama administration was prepared to engage in serious talks if Iran displayed a readiness to do so.
It is worth remembering in this connection what President Obama said in his landmark Cairo speech on 4 June 2009:
“…This issue has been a source of tension between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. For many years, Iran has defined itself in part by opposition to my country, and there is indeed a tumultuous history between us. In the Middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government. This history is well known. Rather than remain trapped in the past, I have made it clear to Iran’s leaders and people that my country is prepared to move forward. The question, now, is not what Iran is against, but what future it wants to build…”[i]
The message urging dialogue could not be more explicit. It was also the first time that the US openly admitted its role in the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953.
On the nuclear issue, the Rouhani administration had two options:
• Continuing the confrontational course on the nuclear program with its negative political and economic consequences,
• Resolving the nuclear issue under a deal which reduced “breakout capacity”, allowed for intrusive inspections, and then enjoying the political/diplomatic and economic benefits that such an agreement would yield.
The first could no longer be business as usual. It would have meant growing tensions and risks for Iran, the region, and beyond.
The second would not have prevented Iran from pursuing a peaceful nuclear program. And, it could have ended the economic sanctions and elevated Iran’s status as a regional actor at a defining time for the Middle East. It could have led to a Western investment in Iran. And, no matter how far Iran may be pushed back from the threshold of breakout capacity, such an agreement could still have confirmed Iran’s status as a “threshold state”.
President Rouhani chose the second path.
On July 14, 2015, the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the UK, the US, and Germany) and Iran reached an agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful.
In announcing final agreement on the JCPoA, the EU High Representative Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif used the same text. In her introductory remarks, Mogherini said, with courage, political will, mutual respect, and leadership, they were able to deliver what the world was hoping for: a shared commitment to peace.
Iranian diplomacy was entitled to half the credit for this achievement and the respect that came with it.
President Hassan Rouhani called the JCPoA a “golden page” in his country’s history, opening a new chapter in Iran’s engagement with the world.
President Obama called the nuclear deal a historic opportunity for Iran. Following the agreement, Secretary Kerry said, “Confidence is never built overnight. It has to be built over time.”
It was hoped that the deal would end decades of hostile relations between Tehran and Washington.
On 20 July 2015, the UN Security Council endorsed the JCPoA through Resolution 2231 (2015).
October 18, 2015, marked the Adoption Day of the JCPoA, the date on which the JCPoA came into force, and participants began implementing their commitments under the plan.
January 16, 2016, marked the Implementation Day of the JCPoA. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified that Iran had implemented its key nuclear-related measures described in the JCPoA.
As a result of Iran verifiably meeting its nuclear commitments, the US and the EU lifted nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, as described in the JCPOA.[ii]
The deal appeared to represent a sea change for Iran’s future. Tehran emerged from the negotiation process as a successful interlocutor for the P5+1, giving a tremendous boost to the regime’s legitimacy. For the West, it moved Iran from being an adversary to a potential partner.
The JCPoA was not about freedom of expression, respect for human rights, or political reform. Nonetheless, it still represented an Iranian spring of hope, perhaps more than anything else, a diplomatic one.
High-level visits to Tehran started immediately following the agreement on the JCPoA on July 14, 2015.
The first to arrive was German Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel on July 19. He was followed by Mogherini and French Foreign Minister Fabius. The latter delivered to President Rouhani an invitation by President Hollande to visit France.
These were months before the IAEA certified that Iran had fulfilled its obligations under the JCPOA, and the US and the EU lifted their nuclear-related oil and financial sanctions against Iran.
In January 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping, the first international leader to visit Iran after the trade restrictions were removed, capped his visit to Tehran with 17 agreements for cooperation in areas including energy, trade, and industry.
Also in January 2016, President Rouhani visited Italy, the Vatican, and France, among many other countries.
First, with the nuclear deal, a decades-long psychological barrier was crossed. Second, Iran’s fulfillment of its obligations under the JCPOA raised the level of confidence placed in Tehran. Third, the deal led to expectations regarding a more constructive role by Tehran on regional issues. Fourth, it was seen as a first step towards internal reform, though at Iran’s own pace. And fifth, with global economic recovery still uncertain, the industrialized countries were seeking business opportunities. Thus, Iran was able to emerge as a more stable and predictable partner in the Middle East.
This is not to say that Iran had undergone a fundamental change. Neither does it mean that it enjoyed a fundamentally different relationship with the West. But something had changed. The nuclear deal had opened a new chapter in Iran’s foreign relations, if nothing else.
President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif did a great service to Iran by leading the effort to break their country’s international isolation. On February 28, 2016, the BBC reported the following, under the heading, “Iran election: Reformists win all 30 Tehran seats”:
“Allies of Iran’s reformist President Hassan Rouhani have won a landslide victory in Tehran, in the first parliamentary vote since Iran signed a nuclear deal with world powers. With 90% of the votes counted, the pro-Rouhani List of Hope is set to take all 30 parliamentary seats in the capital. The leading conservative candidate, Haddad-Adel, is in 31st place.”[iii]
The JCPoA increased the time it would take Iran to acquire enough material for a bomb from 2-3 months to one year; reduced Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium; reduced the number of installed centrifuges by two-thirds; prevented Iran from producing weapons-grade plutonium; and placed Iran’s nuclear activities under monitoring and verification.
However, it gradually became clear that the underlying challenge of coping with a potentially nuclear-armed Iran had led to heightened expectations from a process that sought to mitigate the risks, if not eliminate the challenge.
Those who seemed to have missed the paramount focus of the process undervalued the outcome as a failure to achieve a wholly normalized Iran. And others started to say that the JCPoA, which in effect acknowledged Iran’s rights to enrichment, was a blow to global non-proliferation efforts.
On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that he was terminating the US’s participation in the JCPoA with Iran and re-imposing sanctions lifted under the deal. Prime Minister Netanyahu was delighted. It is worth remembering that on March 3, 2025, three months before the agreement on the JCPoA, he was invited to Washington not by President Obama, but by House Speaker Boehner to address Congress in violation of diplomatic rules and practice. Before Congress, he firmly declared that he was totally against a nuclear deal with Iran.[iv]
European leaders struggled to keep the JCPoA alive, saying that while the deal may not be perfect, it is a step forward that should be followed up on. President Trump, however, seemed to believe that once the JCPoA was scrapped, Iran would have no other choice but to come to the table. That, however, did not happen.
On the contrary, particularly after President Rouhani left office in August 2021, the Tehran regime continued with increased resolve to extend its regional outreach, bringing Iran once again into armed conflict with Israel and the US.
In September 2022, millions across Iran once more expressed their anger and desire for change across the country after 22-year-old Mahsa Amini died in police custody after being arrested for alleged noncompliance with mandatory hijab rules. Human rights groups say at least five hundred people were killed during the protests that followed, and thousands more were arrested.
Thus, the optimism created by the JCPoA became history.
As the International Crisis Group has said, the last round of protests snowballed in the lingering shadow of the twelve days of hostilities with Israel and the US in June 2025 that left Iran’s nuclear program severely damaged, many in the senior ranks of its military killed, its defensive vulnerabilities exposed, and its intelligence deficiencies on full display. If the war forged a moment of national unity, it was short-lived and swiftly undermined by the system’s own failings. Two years of confrontation with Israel after Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack severely degraded both Iran’s nuclear program and the “axis of resistance” that Iran had built up elsewhere in the Middle East, over decades and at massive cost, to project power and deter adversaries.[v]
In brief, in the largest anti-regime rallies since 1979, thousands of Iranian protestors have been killed, thousands detained, and the regime remains determined to respond with brutal campaigns of fear to future protests, knowing that it will eventually force them to go home, i.e., if they are lucky enough.
The Iran protests once again put President Trump in the global spotlight, giving him yet another opportunity to act as the sole US spokesman on international issues, a role he thoroughly enjoys. However, it was clear from the outset that his options for using force against the regime were strictly limited. Nonetheless, the protests allowed him to impose 25 percent tariffs on governments doing business with Tehran.
Now, Trump is threatening to impose tariffs on countries that do not “go along” with his plan to annex Greenland. He is getting more upset with Kyiv. His administration has announced the start of phase two of President Trump’s plan to end the war in Gaza. And Trump is threatening to invoke the rarely used Insurrection Act to quell the Minneapolis protests over federal immigration enforcement operations.
In short, the unpredictable US President will remain in the spotlight for another three years and continue creating challenges for friends and foes.
Tragic times for Iran, and sad times for the US and the West.
The recent protests must have unsettled Iran’s repressive regime. Unfortunately, however, the opposition in Iran lacks effective leadership. The former Crown Prince of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, has no chance. A move toward change can only come from within the regime, and that is out of the question, at least in the foreseeable future, unless Khamenei’s succession becomes an urgent issue.
Under US threats and international pressure, Tehran has denied plans to execute anti-government protestors. Can one say that this is a relief? Hardly. Because thousands are already dead. Those detained may not follow them to the gallows, but what awaits them is torment.
Could Iran and the Middle East have enjoyed a more promising future had the JCPoA remained in force? Perhaps. At least, a determined effort by all would have done no harm.
[i] https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-Cairo-university-6-04-09
[ii] https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/
[iii] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35681250
[iv] https://diplomaticopinion.com/2015/03/06/prime-minister-netanyahu-on-iran/
[v] https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/iran-united-states/iran-crisis-time-change-within?utm_source=mailchimp&utm_medium=email
Diplomatic Opinion - Ali Tuygan 