Trump’s 28-point Ukraine-Russia Peace Plan

November 22, 2025

President Trump’s 28-point Ukraine-Russia peace plan is now public knowledge, making it clear that since the August 15, 2025, Alaska summit, Washington and Moscow have remained engaged in behind-closed-doors diplomatic talks, working on the details of a peace deal, the basic parameters of which were agreed upon during that meeting.[i]

On Friday, during a meeting with the permanent members of the Security Council, President Putin, responding to a question by Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko, as to how the 28-point plan relates to the talks with President Trump in Alaska, said that President Trump’s peace plan was discussed before the meeting in Alaska, the American side asked  Russia to show flexibility, which they did. “However,” he went on, there was a certain pause from the American side following the talks in Alaska, and the Russian side understood that this was connected with Ukraine’s rejection of the peace plan proposed by President Trump, adding that this is precisely why a new version has emerged. Mr. Putin stated that Russia has received this text through the existing communication channels, but it is not being discussed in detail with the Russian side. In explaining why, he said;

“The reason, in my opinion, is the same: the US administration has so far been unable to secure consent from the Ukrainian side, as Ukraine is opposed to it. Apparently, Ukraine and its European allies continue to entertain the illusion that they can inflict a strategic defeat on Russia on the battlefield. I believe this position is not so much the result of insufficient competence – I will not go into that now – but rather stems from an absence of objective information about the actual situation on the ground.”[ii]

President Trump has given Ukraine less than a week to accept his plan. Also on Friday, he said that President Zelensky had little choice but to accept. “He’ll have to like it. And if he doesn’t like it then they should just keep fighting,” Mr. Trump told reporters. To Ukrainians, this sounds like an ultimatum for capitulation.

Again on Friday, in remarks to the UN Security Council, the US Ambassador to the UN, Mike Waltz, referring to the risk of a widening conflict, said that Washington has asked Russia to halt its attacks and meet directly with Ukraine to negotiate a peaceful settlement. He added that Russia has suffered more than a million casualties, has endured severe international sanctions, and it is beyond time for this war to end.

The title of the 28-point plan prompts a comparison between President Trump’s two recent peace initiatives,  although the conflict areas and the parties involved are entirely different.

In the case of Gaza, the 22-point peace plan was written in close coordination by two allies, the US and Israel. After all, Mr. Trump is the “greatest friend Israel has ever had in the White House”, to use Mr. Netanyahu’s words. Did Hamas or moderate Palestinian groups have much of a say in drafting it? No.

The 28-point peace plan was written by the US, in close cooperation with Russia, two adversaries. Reportedly, Kyiv learnt about its contents only a few days ago.

When the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Ms. Kallas was asked, “Have European officials in any way been a part of the drafting of these packages mentioned between the US and Russia?”, she responded, “Not that I know of.”[iii]

Are the European countries NATO allies of the US? Yes. Ukraine is not, but the Biden administration gave it extensive support to fight the Russian invasion. Now, after Mr. Trump’s twists and turns over the last ten months, Ukrainians find themselves in a different spot.

Mr. Trump’s 28-point peace plan states that NATO will not expand further. If the Biden administration and its European partners had admitted this four years ago, if the former had not encouraged the war to weaken Russia, and if the latter had acted with foresight, history could have taken a different course. Ukraine could have joined the EU at some stage and perhaps maintained an uneasy but working relationship with Russia.

Since the war in Ukraine is the first major European military conflict since World War II, the 28-point plan will inevitably lead to more speculation, support, criticism, conflicts of interest, and negotiations among the interested parties than its “junior”, the 22-point Gaza peace plan.

The day after the Alaska summit, on August 16, European leaders had issued a statement that went beyond the earlier ones. It said:

“We are clear that Ukraine must have ironclad security guarantees to effectively defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. We welcome President Trump’s statement that the US is prepared to give security guarantees. The Coalition of the Willing is ready to play an active role. No limitations should be placed on Ukraine’s armed forces or on its cooperation with third countries. Russia cannot have a veto against Ukraine‘s pathway to the EU and NATO. In brief, they foresaw what was to come.

During the next two days, the White House, through public messages, set the agenda of the August 18 summit with President Zelensky and European leaders in Washington. These were,

•          Acceptance of the annexation of Crimea by Russia.

•          Security guarantees for Ukraine, but no membership in NATO.

•          Territorial swaps, which essentially meant “ceding territory” (the four oblasts bordering Russia) to Moscow.

During the US-Europe summit at the White House, leaders did their best to reflect a positive atmosphere. Understandably, however, there was no celebration. President Macron and Chancellor Merz again urged for a ceasefire. The former also mentioned the need for European participation in future talks with Russia.

Clearly, Europe’s appeals for closer consultation on Ukraine fell on deaf ears on the American side, but Washington and Moscow continued to work on a draft.

Some of the 28-point plan’s stipulations are the following:

  • A comprehensive non-aggression agreement to be concluded between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. (However, in almost contradictory language, the plan also states that it is expected that Russia will not invade neighboring countries and NATO will not expand further.)
  • A dialogue between Russia and NATO, mediated by the US, to resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation to ensure global security, and increase opportunities for cooperation and future economic development. (In other words, the US, NATO’s leading member, would mediate to restore relations between Russia on one side, and the Alliance and the EU on the other side.)
  • A joint American-Russian working group on security issues to promote and ensure compliance with all provisions of the peace plan. The plan’s implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by the Peace Council (PC), headed by President Trump. Sanctions will be imposed for violations. (It appears that President Trump, in his quest for the Nobel Peace Prize,  in addition to heading and chairing the “Board of Peace” (BoP) for Gaza, will also chair the PC for Ukraine. However, agreement on who might take a role similar to that of Mr. Blair in the BoP could prove more difficult since this will also require Moscow’s approval.)
  • Ukraine enshrining in its constitution that it will not join NATO; NATO agreeing to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future; and Russia enshrining in law its policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine. However, Ukraine will be eligible for EU membership.
  • In the context of the “US guarantee” for peace, if Russia were to invade Ukraine again, in addition to a decisive coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of the new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked. (Ukraine and European countries are likely to find the wording vague and ask for more precise language on what is meant by “coordinated military response”, either in the text or in a more explicit bilateral commitment by Washington.
  • Ukraine will be a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
  • Regarding the “territorial swaps”, Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk will be recognized as de facto Russian territories, including by the US. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral, demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to Russia. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, “which means de facto recognition along that line”. (In short, Russia’s territorial demands would be met; whether annexations will be called “de facto” or “de jure” would matter little.)
  • There will be no NATO troops in Ukraine, and strict limitations will be imposed on the Ukrainian Armed Forces in terms of manpower and weaponry. (Ukraine, as the target of Russian aggression, is likely to fight those limitations.)
  • A package of measures will be implemented to rebuild Ukraine.
  • Russia’s reintegration into the global economy; the lifting of sanctions; an invitation to Russia to rejoin the G8; and a long-term US-Russia economic cooperation agreement for mutual development in multiple areas. (These must be incentives offered to Moscow by  Washington.)
  • Once all parties agree to the peace plan, the ceasefire will take effect immediately, and both sides will retreat to the agreed points to begin the implementation of the agreement. Sanctions will be imposed for violations. (In words at least, “Sanctions for violations” goes a step further than Mr. Trump’s 22-point peace plan for Gaza, as ceasefire violations by Israel continue, and there is not even a word of disapproval.  Whether the PC, headed by President Trump, would eventually agree on a mechanism to follow ceasefire violations remains to be seen.)
  • Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days. (In other words, for the people of Ukraine, this will be a vote of confidence for President Zelensky and his team of close associates, who are already in domestic trouble. This may help Ukrainians remember who left them with no other choice but to vote for an inexperienced leader in the March 31, 2019, presidential election.

February 24, 2026, will mark the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As he launched the invasion four years ago, President Putin must have thought that Russian forces would sweep over Ukraine to victory within weeks, if not days. This did not happen. Today, the two sides remain engaged in a war of attrition, which has inevitably given Russia an edge. Mr. Putin wants Ukraine and the West to recognize the annexation in 2023 of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts in their entirety. The problem is that Russia has not yet achieved total military control over these four oblasts. In other words, Russia wants Kyiv to give up territories beyond the current battle lines. After four years of fighting, loss of troops, and international reaction to its targeting of civilians, Mr. Putin needs to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion, allowing him to claim that Russia has achieved its objectives, if not outright victory. However, he will not be ready to become a secondary actor in the context of a peace process chaired by President Trump.

All of that puts the Ukrainian leadership in a bind. As for European powers, regardless of their public discourse regarding their support for Ukraine, their stressing that the existing line of contact should be the “starting point” for territorial discussions, they would follow Mr. Trump’s lead, as they did in Gaza. Their priority would be bringing an end to the war, despite the high cost for Ukraine.


[i] https://www.ft.com/content/44d1c236-2a47-48e2-8638-0153db9e6a4b

https://www.indiatoday.in/world/us-news/story/read-full-text-of-trumps-28-point-ukraine-russia-peace-plan-glbs-2823500-2025-11-21

[ii] http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78524

[iii] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-representative-kaja-kallas-upon-arrival-4_en

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About Ali Tuygan

Ali Tuygan is a graduate of the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1967. Between various positions in Ankara, he served at the Turkish Embassy in Brussels, NATO International Staff, Turkish Embassies in Washington and Baghdad, and the Turkish Delegation to NATO. From 1986 to 1989 he was the Principal Private Secretary to the President of the Republic. He then served as ambassador to Ottawa, Riyadh, and Athens. In 1997 he was honored with a decoration by the Italian President. Between these assignments abroad he served twice as Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs. In 2004 he was appointed Undersecretary where he remained until the end of 2006 before going to his last foreign assignment as Ambassador to UNESCO. He retired in 2009. In April 2013 he published a book entitled “Gönüllü Diplomat, Dışişlerinde Kırk Yıl” (“Diplomat by Choice, Forty Years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”) in which he elaborated on the diplomatic profession and the main issues on the global agenda. He has published articles in Turkish periodicals and newspapers.
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