UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 2803 (2025)

November 19, 2026

In my last post, hours before the UN Security Council began its deliberations on the draft US resolution on November 17, I said that the authority to be given to the Board of Peace (Bopp), the lack of detail about the International Stabilization Force (ISF), and the issue of UN Security Council monitoring might require further negotiations; that whether Russia will persist or accommodate Mr. Trump remained uncertain; and that it was unlikely that Beijing and Moscow would readily give him carte blanche in Gaza.

However, the unlikely happened, and the Security Council adopted Resolution 2803 (2025) with thirteen votes in favor, none against, with China and Russia abstaining, thus giving Mr. Trump carte blanche in Gaza.[i]

The preambular paragraph of the Resolution reads:

“Welcoming the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict of 29 September 2025 (“Comprehensive Plan”) (annex 1 to this resolution), and applauding the states that have signed, accepted, or endorsed it, and further welcoming the historic Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity of 13 October 2025 and the constructive role played by the United States of America, the State of Qatar, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Republic of Türkiye, in having facilitated the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip…”

Following the vote, “This will go down as one of the biggest approvals in the History of the United Nations, will lead to further Peace all over the World, and is a moment of true Historic proportion!” Mr. Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform.

Thus, some call the adoption of Resolution 2803 (2025) a major diplomatic achievement for Mr. Trump.

Beijing and Moscow have chosen to abstain essentially for two reasons:

Firstly, had the Security failed to adopt the US draft sooner rather than later, the cease-fire in Gaza could collapse, disappointing not only the people of Gaza, but also many countries which have been engaged in a “balancing act” since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack.

Secondly, Beijing and Moscow know that a lasting peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians is an illusion. Thus, they have chosen to let Washington remain involved in the turbulent Middle East for the foreseeable future rather than getting themselves engaged in an endless discussion about the wording of the Resolution. By having abstained, they have handed over to the Trump administration a task, next to mission impossible.

Furthermore, President Putin would not easily give up trying to win favor with the Trump White House, while differences between the US and Europe on many issues are deepening the disharmony between the two sides of the Atlantic.

Explaining Russia’s abstention, Permanent Representative Nebenzia expressed appreciation for the efforts by the US and other mediators, and said, “To sum up, the US document is yet another pig in a poke. In essence, the Council is giving its blessing to the US initiative relying exclusively on Washington’s honor, we leave the Gaza Strip at the mercy of the Board of Peace and the ISF, whose working methods are still unknown to us.”[ii]

At the end of the meeting, when asked by journalists why Russia had chosen not to block the resolution, Mr. Nebenzia recalled that several Arab and Muslim countries—including the Palestinian delegation—had explicitly asked Moscow to “give a chance” to the US text, despite their deep reservations. “We are concerned about the carte blanche that the Council has given to those who promoted the plan,” he said, denouncing the absence of real guarantees that the Security Council will be able to monitor the implementation of the strategy on the ground.[iii] In brief, Russia’s concerns did not trigger a veto.

Both Moscow and Beijing have criticized the Resolution. They have pointed out the lack of clarity on key mechanisms, the failure to ensure UN participation, and the need to reaffirm a strong commitment to the two-state solution.

In fact, what is stated in the Resolution is a combination of what was said in paragraphs 9 and 19 of Mr. Trump’s peace plan. However, The Guardian has reported that the reference to Palestinian statehood was a compromise addition to an initial US draft, which did not mention it. In other words, “stronger language” on the Palestinian question helped get the US draft over the finish line.

Russia’s draft resolution, backed by China, was emphatic about the future of the Palestinian territory, saying it “reiterates its unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-State solution.” Additionally, Russia’s version foresaw a solution “where two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure and recognized borders, consistent with international law and relevant UN resolutions.”[iv]

Regardless, the day before the adoption of the Resolution, Mr. Netanyahu once again said, “our opposition to a Palestinian state on any territory has not changed.”

In explaining the US vote for Resolution 2803 (2025), Ambassador Mike Waltz, the US Representative to the UN, said that the Bopp, which President Trump will lead, remains the cornerstone of the effort. Earlier in the debate, he had issued a warning to Moscow, making it clear that Washington would not accept postponements or significant changes to the text agreed upon with the main regional players.

The Board will coordinate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, facilitate Gaza’s development, and support a technocratic committee of Palestinians responsible for the day-to-day operations of Gaza’s civil service and administration, while the Palestinian Authority fully implements its reform program.

It will also establish a temporary ISF in Gaza to deploy under a unified command. The ISF will collaborate with Israel and Egypt, along with the newly trained and vetted Palestinian police force, to help secure border areas and stabilize the security situation in Gaza by ensuring “the process of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, including the destruction and prevention of rebuilding of the military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, as well as the permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups…” It seems that the wording of the resolution regarding the tasks assigned to the ISF is causing concern among the likely participants about the possible risks to their troops.

Hamas has said that Resolution 2803 (2025) fails to meet the political and humanitarian demands of Palestinians.

Last week, the heavy rainfall flooded the camps of displaced Palestinians in Gaza, underlining yet again that the situation in the Strip is a humanitarian disaster and a ceasefire, if not lasting peace, is the dictate of reason. Thus, the adoption of the Resolution is a positive development. From now on, the world will focus on the Trump White House and the BoP.


[i] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/sites/default/files/2025-11/SCR%202803%20%282025%29%20on%20Gaza%20adopted%20%28E%29.pdf

[ii]https://russiaun.ru/en/news/unsc_171125

[iii] https://lavocedinewyork.com/en/un/2025/11/17/security-council-approves-us-resolution-for-international-force-in-gaza/

[iv] https://passblue.com/2025/11/17/the-un-security-council-accepts-us-plan-for-gaza-with-wariness/?utm_source=PassBlue+List&utm_campaign=fe10e5b15a-RSS-ST_SetonHall_22Mar2025&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4795f55662-fe10e5b15a-55100883

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About Ali Tuygan

Ali Tuygan is a graduate of the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1967. Between various positions in Ankara, he served at the Turkish Embassy in Brussels, NATO International Staff, Turkish Embassies in Washington and Baghdad, and the Turkish Delegation to NATO. From 1986 to 1989 he was the Principal Private Secretary to the President of the Republic. He then served as ambassador to Ottawa, Riyadh, and Athens. In 1997 he was honored with a decoration by the Italian President. Between these assignments abroad he served twice as Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs. In 2004 he was appointed Undersecretary where he remained until the end of 2006 before going to his last foreign assignment as Ambassador to UNESCO. He retired in 2009. In April 2013 he published a book entitled “Gönüllü Diplomat, Dışişlerinde Kırk Yıl” (“Diplomat by Choice, Forty Years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”) in which he elaborated on the diplomatic profession and the main issues on the global agenda. He has published articles in Turkish periodicals and newspapers.
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