Obstacles to Peace in Gaza

November 17, 2025

On  November 11, 2025, Reuters, under the heading “Partition of Gaza a looming risk as Trump’s plan falters”, reported that a de facto partition of Gaza between an area controlled by Israel and another ruled by Hamas is increasingly likely, with efforts to advance President Trump’s plan to end the war beyond a ceasefire faltering.

Under the first stage of the plan, which took effect on October 10, the Israeli military currently controls 53% of the territory, including much of its farmland, along with Rafah in the south, parts of Gaza City, and other urban areas.[i]

Later, the BBC reported that Israel had destroyed more than 1,500 buildings in Gaza since the ceasefire took effect, and entire neighborhoods controlled by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were levelled in less than a month, apparently through demolitions. Many of the razed buildings did not appear to have been damaged before being destroyed; for example, in eastern Khan Younis, around Abasan al-Kabira.[ii]

Given the destruction in Gaza and the years needed to rebuild it, ‘temporary” or “voluntary” relocation of Gazans remains a possibility, even though Mr. Trump has stated that no one will be forced to leave Gaza under his ceasefire plan.

As for the West Bank, today, more than half a million Israeli settlers live in the occupied territory. Their numbers and settlements are expanding, encroaching on what has traditionally been considered the heart of a Palestinian state. With increasing settler violence, widely covered in Western media, more attention is being directed toward the possibility of Israel annexing the territory.

In August, I suggested that with the new settlement projects in the West Bank and Israel’s major attack in Gaza, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s goal might be to push the Gazans into a small part of the Strip in the south, move the West Bank Palestinians there as well, persuade Egypt to cede more land beyond the Rafah crossing, and then turn to the supporters of the “two-state solution” and tell them, “There it is, your State of Palestine.”[iii]

On October 9, 2025, in a must-read report titled “Sovereignty in All but Name: Israel’s Quickening Annexation of the West Bank”, the International Crisis Group, referring also to the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ)  Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, said that Israel has been constantly expanding its West Bank settlements, moving toward the annexation of significant parts of the West Bank.[iv]  The report led me to repeat my earlier impression.[v]

Last week, in a remarkable The New York Times guest essay titled, “There Is No Cease-Fire in the West Bank”,  Mairav Zonszein, the senior Israel analyst with the International Crisis Group, drew attention to settler violence in the West Bank, and to the determination of members of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s coalition to formally annex the West Bank to preclude the establishment of a Palestinian state, adding that Mr. Netanyahu himself hedges on the issue.[vi]

Since the attacks of October 7, 2023, over 1000 West Bank Palestinians have been killed by the settlers and Israeli forces. Another 3000 Palestinians have been displaced from their homes and lands largely because of Israeli settler violence.

In recent days, Palestinian harvesters have come under attack. Israeli activists who had joined them to provide a protective presence were assaulted as well. Last Tuesday, dozens of Israeli settlers launched a large-scale arson attack on Palestinians in the West Bank, targeting factories and farmland between the major cities of Nablus and Tulkarem.[vii]

Under President Trump’s Gaza peace plan, the US will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) to deploy in Gaza immediately. Washington has circulated a draft UN Security Council resolution that would grant the multinational force and a transitional governing body (Board of Peace) a two-year mandate.[viii] Reportedly, however, China and Russia have called for the removal of the Board of Peace from the text, and Russia has proposed an alternative resolution. For the two powers, the lack of a monitoring mechanism by the UN Security Council is a problem. Some countries want stronger wording about the two-state solution. Moreover, it seems that governments remain hesitant to commit troops to the proposed 20,000-man-strong ISF since responsibilities extend beyond peacekeeping and might lead to confrontation with Hamas or other Palestinian groups.

According to recent reports, Washington wants its draft resolution voted on in the UN Security Council as soon as possible, even today. However, the authority to be given to the Board of Peace, the lack of detail about the ISF, and above all, the question of UN Security Council monitoring might require further negotiations. Whether Russia will persist or accommodate Mr. Trump remains uncertain. Moreover, reports about briefings to President Trump on options for air strikes against military or government facilities and drug-trafficking routes in Venezuela make it unlikely that Beijing and Moscow will readily give him carte blanche in Gaza.

Türkiye has declared its readiness to contribute troops to the ISF, but Israel immediately raised objections. Last week, Istanbul’s Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Katz, National Security Minister Ben-Gvir, Army Chief Eyal Zamir, Israeli Naval Forces Commander David Saar Salama, and 32 other Israeli officials, drawing a sharp response from Mr. Katz.

With the arrest warrants, Ankara’s stance against the Netanyahu government continues. The warrants also serve a domestic political purpose. However, they might disappoint Mr. Trump because the US Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria, Thomas J. Barrack, recently mentioned the possibility of a trade deal between Israel and Türkiye at the Manama Dialogue, suggesting that President Trump, eager for Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords, probably has plans for Israeli-Turkish reconciliation as well.

Interestingly, in the past, the discussion was mostly about “Middle East peace” or “Arab-Israeli peace”. In time, references increasingly focused on “Israeli-Palestinian peace”. And now, everyone talks about “peace in Gaza”.

At present, Ankara is expecting a reward in Syria for its contributions to the ouster of President Assad and the Gaza ceasefire. It is also trying to align its “terrorless Türkiye project” with a security deal in Syria. Unfortunately, however, these “contributions” and our controversial involvement in the Gaza conflict have deepened our entanglement in the Middle East.

As for domestic political developments in Türkiye, the AKP government continues negotiating with PKK leader Öcalan, who is serving a life sentence, while Istanbul’s Chief Public Prosecutor is demanding a prison sentence of more than 2,000 years for Ekrem İmamoğlu, the jailed opposition mayor of Istanbul.


[i] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/partition-gaza-looming-risk-trumps-plan-falters-2025-11-11/

[ii] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0mxylxw48yo

[iii] https://diplomaticopinion.com/2025/08/25/the-contradiction-between-trumps-policies-in-ukraine-and-gaza/#more-2802

[iv] https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/israelpalestine/252-sovereignty-all-name-israels-quickening-annexation-west-bank?utm_source=mailchimp&utm_medium=email

[v] https://diplomaticopinion.com/2025/10/14/peace-in-gaza/#more-2832

[vi] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/11/opinion/west-bank-cease-fire-gaza-israel.html?campaign_id=39&emc=edit_ty_20251111&instance_id=166205&nl=opinion-today&regi_id=60473709&segment_id=210382&user_id=6e50439e867e4155600e5ebabac2aa22

[vii] https://www.timesofisrael.com/settlers-launch-major-west-bank-arson-attack-idf-police-arrest-four-suspects/

[viii] https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/israelpalestine/what-look-gaza-peace-plan-comes-un-security-council?utm_source=mailchimp&utm_medium=email

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About Ali Tuygan

Ali Tuygan is a graduate of the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1967. Between various positions in Ankara, he served at the Turkish Embassy in Brussels, NATO International Staff, Turkish Embassies in Washington and Baghdad, and the Turkish Delegation to NATO. From 1986 to 1989 he was the Principal Private Secretary to the President of the Republic. He then served as ambassador to Ottawa, Riyadh, and Athens. In 1997 he was honored with a decoration by the Italian President. Between these assignments abroad he served twice as Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs. In 2004 he was appointed Undersecretary where he remained until the end of 2006 before going to his last foreign assignment as Ambassador to UNESCO. He retired in 2009. In April 2013 he published a book entitled “Gönüllü Diplomat, Dışişlerinde Kırk Yıl” (“Diplomat by Choice, Forty Years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”) in which he elaborated on the diplomatic profession and the main issues on the global agenda. He has published articles in Turkish periodicals and newspapers.
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