November  4, 2025

President Trump announced his 20-point Gaza Peace Plan on September 29, 2025, in a press conference with Prime Minister Netanyahu at the White House.[i] The ceasefire went into effect on October 10. As expected, there have been many ceasefire violations since then. On October 28, Israeli strikes in Gaza killed at least 104 people, including dozens of children, according to local health authorities. The strikes came after Israel accused Hamas of killing a soldier. Thus, the deployment of an international force to Gaza, as envisaged in the Plan, appears to have moved up on the agenda. However, this will only follow the formation of the Board of Peace that will govern Gaza “until the Palestinian Authority completes its reform program”.

Under articles 15 and 16 of President Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan,

• The US will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) to deploy in Gaza immediately.
• The ISF will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza.
• The ISF will work with Israel and Egypt to help secure border areas, along with newly trained Palestinian police forces.
• The parties will agree upon a deconfliction mechanism.
• As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the US, with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens.

Both the Board of Peace and the ISF will need a UN mandate approved by the Security Council to become operational. Defining the responsibilities of the Board of Peace and the ISF in greater detail beyond the 20-point peace plan will not be easy. It will take time.

Among those listed as potential participants in the ISF are Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Egypt, Türkiye, Indonesia, and Azerbaijan.

Jordan has made it clear that it will not contribute troops to the ISF. Foreign Minister Safadi has said, “We’re too close to the issue and we cannot deploy troops in Gaza,” adding that his country is nonetheless ready to cooperate with the international force. (emphasis added)

Recently, the US Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria, Thomas J. Barrack, told the Manama Dialogue that the Gaza ceasefire could not have happened without Türkiye, and President Trump has acknowledged this. He said that Israel is rightly concerned about Türkiye’s participation in the secondary force because of the rhetoric between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Erdoğan, which sounds as if the former is after a greater Israel, taking everything down to Türkiye, and the latter wants the Ottoman Empire back, and take over Israel, neither of which is true. He added that Türkiye “will participate.”

Yesterday, a Washington Post article titled “Trump sees central role for Turkey in Gaza peace, but Israel is crying foul” also highlighted Ankara’s role in the Gaza ceasefire and drew attention to the inherent difficulties in relations between Israel and Türkiye.[ii]

Considering the two years of death and destruction, Ankara’s contribution to the Gaza ceasefire is indeed a positive step. However, what has enabled Türkiye to do this is the Turkish government’s support for Hamas, which President Erdoğan views as a national resistance group. This contrasts with how Türkiye’s NATO allies and the Gulf countries see Hamas. Their view of the Muslim Brotherhood, which Ankara also supports, is no different.

At present, Turkish democracy is in sharp decline. The economy is in serious trouble with extremely high inflation. Therefore, the AKP government may wish to present its participation in the ISF to the Turkish public as a sign of growing regional power, serving as a distraction. However, this would be a mistake. Already with a troubling foreign and security policy agenda, the best approach for Türkiye’s long-term interests is to avoid participating in what is likely to be a difficult and costly project with little or no oversight from Ankara. Türkiye is not as “close to the issue” as Jordan geographically, but it is not far away and is very much involved.

In Manama, Ambassador Barrack also mentioned the prospect of a trade deal between Israel and Türkiye. President Trump, eager to see Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords, must have plans for Israeli-Turkish reconciliation as well. He may see the Israeli-Turkish cooperation in the ouster of President Assad as a starting point. Actually, the launching of a meaningful effort in that direction can only begin with a mutual commitment by the two countries to refrain from supporting groups that are considered “terrorist” by the other, not only in Gaza or Syria, but across the Middle East.

[i] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c70155nked7o

[ii] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/11/03/gaza-turkey-hamas-israel-trump/